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Introduction
"The Social Construction of Life." What does this title mean to you? Take a minute and jot down your
thoughts.
While you do this, here is a non-distracting graphic.

What was your response to being asked this at the outset? What did you feel? Think? Do? Take another
minute and explore your responses? Be honest.
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Another non-distracting graphic.

Probably most of you just looked ahead to see what point I intended to make by starting with these
questions. I could make you wait if this were a lecture you were listening to. If you were students, I could
have used my authority as a teacher to get you to write down something. But this is a book so I cannot
enforce readers' compliance with my directions. Let me then move on and explain the meaning and
associations I attach to key terms, then provide an overview of the themes that unfold over the chapters.
But first, note that:
•

I value people not accepting anything without questioning.

•

I am also prepared for you, the readers, to feel disturbed or even anxious, unsure of what constitutes
the expected response.

•

I want to open for your questioning many issues which you might have taken to be well established or
which you would previously have waited for someone else to provide complete and tidy answers for.

Overview of Themes and Terms
This book aims to expand the boundaries of the influences that readers consider when interpreting the
practices and products of the life sciences ("biology") and their impact on society. In this spirit, "science"
is not just a knowledge-generating dialogue between theory and reality, but
•

an outlet for curiosity

•

a body of accepted knowledge

•

a process of establishing knowledge
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•

what scientists do

•

institutions (laboratories, professional associations, funding agencies, journals, etc.)

•

a source of social authority

•

a producer of social impacts.

At each level social action is occurring, which involves
•
•

the use of language
making one's life and work in a particular time and place, and from a (possibly changing) social
position

•

economic relations

•

political conflict and negotiation.

Given this diversity of social considerations, the relations between biology and society is constructed, in
the sense both of
•
•

a building which is made of many different materials, and
an interpretation drawing upon precedents and established assumptions.

Moreover, this social construction of life connects not only the life sciences, but also
•
•

living processes
groups of people's lives and livelihood

•

the reader's own life.

When I define critical thinking I point to inquiry that is informed by a strong sense of how things could be
otherwise. I believe that people understand things better when they have placed established
assumptions, themes, facts, theories, practices, and social relations in tension with alternatives. [C]ritical
thinking as I define it does not depend on my readers rejecting conventional accounts and adopting some
alternative dogma. It does, however, require you to move through places of uncertainty. This book
destabilizes established approaches, raises many propositions well in advance of demonstrating them,
and invites you to use the propositions in your own thinking and writing—to experiment, take risks, and
through experience develop tools that work for you.
In the spirit of critical thinking, we can place in tension the idea that something is constructed with the
idea that it is determined. In construction (in sense of building, not of interpretation):
•

Many different kinds of components are linked together over time, each step building on what has
already been constructed. This implies that:

•

The outcome has multiple contributing causes, and thus:

•

There are multiple points of intervention or engagement that could modify the course of development.
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In contrast, when something is determined:
•

The links between proposed causes and outcome are direct, e.g., severe depression is a biochemical
imbalance.

•

Few steps are involved in the causation and a single kind or small number of causes dominate.

•

Few opportunities arise for things to have happened differently, in particular, social policy will not be
able to change the outcome greatly.

Interpreting Ideas of Nature
Broad-brush themes:
•

What is said or written, instead of being taken literally, can be interpreted so as to expose what is only
implicit.

•

In the spirit of critical thinking, consider the contrast between, on one hand, "When I hear people say,
'Nature tells us..' I hear them telling me their views about the way they want people/society to do
things" and, on the other hand, "I still think it is important to know what is natural and what is
unnatural. Otherwise anything is acceptable."

•

Interpretation of ideas of nature (following Williams 1980): They are often invoked to justify aspects of
the social order, usually aspects becoming problematic at that particular historical juncture, or
proposed alternatives to the social order. So, when we hear people debating what nature is or what is
natural, we can ask ourselves what it is about society that is being debated.

The structure of origin stories
Interpret story-telling, focusing on origin stories both outside science and inside.
•

Story tellers select elements and arrange them in a sequence. Selection and arrangement simplify
the complexity of influences needing to be considered to understand the outcome and cover over the
uncertain or unknowable information. The story-teller not only gives emphasis or credence to the
outcome, but can also try to make plausible the causality implied in the story.

•

Stories are more compelling if they adopt a familiar structure and if they resonate with other stories.

•

The influence of structural (or structuring) themes can be seen by identifying them and asking what
would happen to the account if an opposing or alternative theme were employed.

•

Playing one theme off against another and creating some interpretive tension is an example of critical
thinking in the sense of understanding ideas or practice better by holding them in tension with
alternatives.

4

•

Origin stories are important because they are used to make sense of and often to justify the state of
affairs we find ourselves in now.

•

Many scientific accounts can be read as stories or narratives (Landau as described in Lewin),
especially when
1. they attempt to deal with uncertain or unknowable information, e.g., in accounts of origins—
meaning both the point of origin and the subsequent history—and evolution; or
2. with many connections and causes rather than a few experimentally controlled factors.

Multiple layers in influencing an audience: The case of Darwin's On the Origin of Species
Having been sensitized to the story telling aspect of scientific writing, to the dominant structural themes
adopted in accounts or origins, and to the ideas of nature that were invoked before Darwin to support
ideas of the social order (whether that was the actual, idealised, or desired order), we are now in a better
position to read Darwin and interpret his ideas on evolution and on the means by which it occurs.
•

Williams's account of the history of ideas of nature conveys a general trend: Ever increasing
interaction of societies with/in nature -> idea that nature has a history -> evolutionary theories of
nature -> contested issue: do humans evolve too?

•

Darwin's specific contribution: The idea that everything in nature is adapted to its place, but that this is
the result of an on-going struggle for existence, not given by creation once and for all.

•

Broad-brush interpretation of Darwin's idea about how evolution happens: The idea of evolution by
natural selection relates to and supports a dominant idea about social order, namely, that one’s place
in society is a result of a natural process of selection, and, given that the result is adapted, this is
right/ justifiable/ as good as we could hope for.

•

Such an interpretation raises a question: What did Darwin actually do in his scientific research that
resulted in a theory that fits that social interpretation?
Answer: To influence his audience in 1859 England, he carefully built up multiple layers in his
scientific theory: argument, analogy, metaphor, and defences.

Metaphors of Coordination and Development
•

Until the 1920s, biological inheritance had much broader connotations than transmission of
something discrete (which we now call genes). It also included development. After all, when it is said
that a person resembles their parent, two aspects of the transmission of traits to offspring are being
raised: how does an offspring develop to have the trait in question at all, e.g., its eye color, and how
does the outcome of the development at some point in the lifespan differ from that person to the rest
of the family or population. What, then is the relationship between the study of development and the
study of difference? What is the role of genes in both? Competing answers to these questions are
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evident in the contrast between the work of Just and Goldschmidt in the early decades of the
twentieth century.
•

Interpreting the work of Darwin has introduced the role of metaphor in scientific theories and their
presentation to an audience. The account by Gilbert of Just versus Goldschmidt revolves around his
interpretation of the metaphors underlying their work.

•

Extend this to the present: Explore alternative metaphors of or analogies to embryological
development that do not rely on a central controller but capture the ability of the organism to coordinate its own differentiation and change and thereby make itself.

What causes a disease?—the consequences of hereditarianism in the case of pellagra
•

•

The causes proposed reflect the social actions desired or supported given that
o

the categories used (and thus data collected)

o

assumptions needed to make causal claims from patterns
§

are places where social assumptions can influence the scientist's decision, and

§

science cannot be done without decisions in these areas

When people make explanations, you may look at how they attempted to identify or locate the
causation and consider alternative styles of causal explanation. If a scientist is emphasizing, say, a
unitary cause, consider the multiple factors they are excluding.

•

This approach will help you raise questions about the other commitments that influence their choice
of questions, categories, factors, and admissable explanations. The causal explanation that is
advanced often corresponds to the person's commitments to certain forms of social action, e.g.
Galton (Darwin's cousin) didn't measure any environmental variables and was thus able only to reach
conclusions about (supposedly) inborn characters; Davenport and others similarly denied the
significance of Goldberger's experimental evidence for dietary basis of pellagra.

•

Identification of more proximate causes (e.g., a lung cancer gene) is not necessarily needed to
ensure the most effective action (e.g., we can encourage people to stop smoking independently of
knowing the genetic mechanisms of lung cancer).

How changeable are IQ test scores?
•

A continuation of the critical thinking theme of interpreting scientific ideas in relation to the actions
favored by the exponents of those ideas is to pose questions that can be asked of all sides: What can
we do (on the basis of the science)? What more would we need to find out before being confident in
answering the first question?

•

By unpacking the debate between Lewontin and Jensen, the following themes should emerge:
o

There are no simple explanation about genetics and socially significant traits, especially regarding
average racial differences. Therefore: be skeptical of anyone who proposes such an explanation
(i.e., scrutinize where they are coming from).
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o

There are researchers who have detailed, often technical cases to make (even if their conclusion
is quite simple, e.g., Jensen believes it is plausible that genes account for (average) racial
differences). Their argument can be teased out into their components (in this case, with help from
Lewontin, who can handle the technical side and has views about the political/social implications
and underpinnings of the science).

o

What can we do (on the basis of the science) is worth asking of all sides. (Jensen thinks we have
tried and failed to equalize education so educate people according to their innate capacities
[actually, educate people according to the typological generalization about the average
differences between the races]; Lewontin thinks educational professionals have not tried very
hard and when society is committed to equalizing education ways will be found.)

Social negotiations around genetic screening
•

The debate about the changeability of IQ test scores (Jensen vs. Lewontin) referred to the heritability
of IQ test scores, but no actual genes. It also referred to the limitations and possibilities of education,
but did not focus on specific educational projects—how they succeeded or failed and in what
circumstances. In contrast, this session examines how specific groups (or "voices") in society shape
or are involved in the application of knowledge about specific genes.

•

Rapp draws our attention to many constituencies and voices in the arena or reproductive
interventions, in contrast to the dominance of white, male experts and a medical model: "Until we
locate and listen to the discourses of women who encounter and interpret a new reproductive
technology in their own lives, we cannot go beyond a medical model." Medical model = individual
risks, benefits and choices (aided by dominant metaphors of human perfectibility and individuals
holding within them their potential) vs. situated, social responses, e.g. social support for the disabled,
Down Syndrome support groups.

•

In the case of phenylketonuria (PKU), Paul (1998) shows that significant complexities should be
expected to arise if neonatal genetic diagnosis and advice about risks and about possible protective
measures become widespread. Moreover, just as there are many voices that could be listened to in
understanding how to use new genetic information, there are diverse influences to which PKU
individuals are subject on their pathways of development over their life course.

Intersecting processes involving genes and environment
•

This chapter extends perspectives from the previous two—the debate about the changeability of IQ
test scores and the possible involvement of multiple voices in the application of knowledge about
specific genes—by tracing "intersecting processes"—the sequence of multiple causes building on
each other over the individual’s life history. This account of causality permits a number of conclusions
about nature-nurture debates:

7

•

Neither the unchangeability of genes nor the reliability of some gene- or biochemistry-based
intervention would prove that the genes are the most significant cause of the behavior or disease that
has been occurring in the absence of such treatment.

•

Critics of genetic explanations could dismiss the attribution of an individual’s behavior to genes (or
50% or 80% to genes) as a technically meaningless partitioning of variation without placing
themselves at the other pole from genetic determination. That is, they would not have to make the
counterclaim that the environment determines behavior or that, if the right environment were found,
any desired behavior could be elicited. An intersecting processes account addresses malleability or
immalleability of behavioral outcomes without ruling out genetic contributions.

•

Similarly, critics would not need to rest their case on demonstrations that behavioral genetics has
been or still is methodologically flawed, on textual deconstructions of the categories and rhetoric
employed, or on attributions of political bias to the supporters of behavioral geneticists. These are all
interesting, but, in light of an intersecting processes account of the behavior, not necessary for a
conceptual critique of genetic determinism.

•

There are multiple points of intervention or engagement that could modify the course of development.

Looking back; looking forward
The introduction stated that social action involves the use of language, making one's life and work in a
particular time and place, and from a (possibly changing) social position, economic relations, and political
conflict and negotiation. The chapters have emphasized the first two features. However, in the
illustrations of intersecting processes—the social origins of depression in a population of working-class
women and soil erosion in Oaxaca—economics and politics are evident. Future chapters that may be
added would give more explicit attention to the contribution of economic relations and political conflict and
negotiation to the social construction of life.

Structure of chapters
1. Introduce simple theme(s), building on previous sessions
1b. amplified by mini-lecture (which might include interactive activity)
2. Precis of reading with directions about reading the full work
3. Activity so students can work with simple theme, but then
3b. see its shortcomings
4. Synthesis and extensions: notes summarizing themes in more complex formulation
4b. including notes on pedagogical issues
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5. Connections and resources, e.g., annotations to additional readings
5b. Online forum, through which students can provide suggestions and resources for revising the chapter
5c. Adaptation of themes from the chapter to students' own projects of learning about or engaging with
biology in its social context: Suggestions for how to do that.
Boxes (or exhibits) referred to (i.e., linked in the online version) in a chapter follow at the end of the five
sections.
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Interpreting ideas about nature as ideas about society
1. Introduction
The book progressively develops a framework for interpreting biology in its social context, starting with
the broad-brush themes of this chapter:
•

What is said or written, instead of being taken literally, can be interpreted so as to expose what is only
implicit.

•

In the spirit of critical thinking, consider the contrast between, on one hand, "When I hear people say,
'Nature tells us..' I hear them telling me their views about the way they want people/society to do
things" and, on the other hand, "I still think it is important to know what is natural and what is
unnatural. Otherwise anything is acceptable."

•

Interpretation of ideas of nature (following Williams 1980): They are often invoked to justify aspects of
the social order, usually aspects becoming problematic at that particular historical juncture, or
proposed alternatives to the social order. So, when we hear people debating what nature is or what is
natural, we can ask ourselves what it is about society that is being debated.

1b. Mini-lecture
Interpreting a series of images from history, in order to introduce the framework of Williams (1980).

2. Reading
Raymond Williams (1926-89) was an English-Welsh writer about culture, literature, language, and politics,
as well as a novelist. His essay, "Ideas of nature," gives us a sense of the changing meanings given to
the term “nature,” the coexistence of contradictory meanings at any one time, and how these meanings
reflect ideas about the social order being defended or promoted. There is a cycle: society is projected into
nature and then propositions about society are read back out of this “nature.” Ideas of nature are often
invoked to explain aspects of the social order, usually aspects becoming problematic at that particular
historical juncture. So, when we hear people debating what nature is/what is natural, we can ask
ourselves what it is about society that is being debated. In other words, we should try to expose what is
only implicit, what is not literally stated.
Williams's essay is somewhat dense, so employ two reading strategies:
•

Use a timeline to make notes as you go, with 2 narrow columns and a wider one for what is
happening generally in society; the period or century; and the different ideas of nature aligned with
the periods.

•

After reading each section, write down the thesis or theme(s) and quotations that strike you as
important or as puzzling.
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Opening pages of Williams (1980; full essay available through password-protected page.)

3. Activities
•

In small groups, students compare and contrast their timelines, important and puzzling themes, then
choose one to bring into whole-group discussion.

•

On their own, students continue the three-person discussion below. Then, in small groups again,
students compare and contrast the "trialogues" and choose one contrast or conflict to bring into
whole-group discussion.

•

Students visit a natural history museum, conducting a "scavenger hunt" for exhibits that illustrate
Williams's account and for exhibits that contradict or complicate his account.

Nature, a three-person conversation
Partovo ("Humans are a Part Of nature"): Humans are living organisms. As such they are part of nature.
Therefore, everything they do is natural.
Separato ("Humans have become Separate from nature"): People have lost touch with nature and that is
why our environment and our society are in trouble.
Interpreto ("Interpret Socially views about nature and what is natural"): When I hear people draw lessons
from nature, I hear them really telling me something about their views on society.
Separato: You'll have to explain this interpretation to me, because, without a sense of what is natural and
what is unnatural, anything is acceptable.
Interpreto: But Partovo has a sense of what is natural that tells him everything is acceptable.
Separato: Is that right?
Partovo: Yes.
Separato: So you mean mad cow disease, polio, AIDS, and so on are acceptable?
Partovo: Um, yes. We could look at them as forms of population control for the human species.
Separato: So you wouldn't invest in research for AIDS treatments?
Partovo: No. And I don't think the government should either. AIDS affects mostly gays and IV drug users.
Their practices do not meet widely held community standards and so they don't deserve society's help.
Separato: I think you are out of date about who gets AIDS. But, putting that aside, I thought you said
anything humans do is natural and thus acceptable.
Partovo: Well, not everything.
Separato: So, what is and what is not?
... (continued by reader)

4. Synthesis and extensions
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•

It is very easy to slip from interpreting "nature" (ideas about nature) back into discussion about uninterpreted nature as the actual material or living world, pointing to the importance of the latter as, for
example, a source of ideas for new products (Venton 2011). This schema helps to keep nature and
"nature" distinct and distinguishes between nature/"nature" as untouched by human activity vs.
including human activity.

•

Time line for Williams (1980)

•

Extended trialogue (http://www.faculty.umb.edu/peter_taylor/naturetrialogue.html)

•

There are many dualisms in our thinking in which a natural or universal characteristic is in opposition
or tension with one that is cultural, artificial, or particular. The impact of such dualisms draws in part
from the assumption that natural is the way things are supposed to be: Set of Nature-Culture
dualisms.

5. Connections and resources
•

Berger, J. (1980). "Why Look at Animals?". Pp. 1-26 in About Looking. New York: Pantheon Books
annotation TBA

•

Worster, D. (1977). "Science in Arcadia & The empire of reason". Pp. 2-55 in Nature's Economy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
annotation TBA

5b. Add to this blog post to make contributions to the revision of the chapter above or to an annotated
collection of readings and other resources related to the chapter.
5c. Adaptation of themes from the chapter to students' own projects of engaging others in learning or
critical thinking about biology in its social context. Suggestions:
i. Locate a series of images related to your project and guide others in interpreting what is implicit.
ii. Identify texts related to your project in which nature or natural is used to support ideas about what is
right or what is the way things should be or what is hard to overcome even if one wanted to.
iii. Get you audience involved in extending your own multi-person conversation that explores different
views on a topic. Make sure you build in the idea that what is literally said is open to interpretation in
terms of what is implied. Aim to expose and explore the tensions or contradictions in what people say.
iv. Brainstorm with instructor.
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Interpreting a series of images from history, in order to introduce the framework of Williams
TBA insert thumbnails and captions
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Ideas of Nature
From Williams, R. (1980). Problems in materialism and culture (pp. 67-85). London: Verso.
One touch of nature may make the whole world kin, but usually, when we say nature, do we mean
to include ourselves? I know some people would say that the other kind of nature-trees, hills,
brooks, animals-has a kindly effect. But I've noticed that they then often contrast it with the world
of humans and their relationships.
I begin from this ordinary problem of meaning and reference because I want this inquiry to be
active, and because I intend an emphasis when I say that the idea of nature contains, though often
unnoticed, an extraordinary amount of human history. Like some other fundamental ideas which
express mankind's vision of itself and its place in the world, 'nature' has a nominal continuity, over
many centuries, but can be seen, in analysis, to be both complicated and changing, as other ideas
and experiences change. I've previously attempted to analyse some comparable ideas, critically
and historically. Among them were culture, society, individual, class, art, tragedy. But I'd better
say at the outset that, difficult as all those ideas are, the idea of nature makes them seem
comparatively simple. It has been central, over a very long period, to many different kinds of
thought. Moreover it has some quite radical difficulties at the very first stages of its expression:
difficulties which seem to me to persist.
Some people, when they see a word, think the first thing to do is to define it. Dictionaries are
produced, and, with a show of authority no less confident because it is usually so limited in place
and time, what is called a proper meaning is attached. But while it may be possible to do this, more
or less satisfactorily, with certain simple names of things and effects, it is not only impossible but
irrelevant in the case of more complicated ideas. What matters in them is not the proper meaning
but the history and complexity of meanings: the conscious changes, or consciously different uses:
and just as often those changes and differences which, masked by a nominal continuity, come to
express radically different and often at first unnoticed changes in experience and history, I'd then
better say at once that any reasonably complete analysis of these changes in the idea of nature
would be very far beyond the scope of a lecture, but I want to try to indicate some of the main
points, the general outlines, of such an analysis, and to see what effects these may have on some
of our contemporary arguments and concerns.
The central point of the analysis can be expressed at once in the singular formation of the term. As
I understand it, we have here a case of a definition of quality which becomes, through real usage,
based on certain assumptions, a description of the world. Some of the early linguistic history is
difficult to interpret, but we still have, as in the very early uses, these two very different bearings.
I can perhaps illustrate them from a well-known passage in Burke:
In a state of rude nature there is no such thing as a people.... The idea of a people is the
idea of a corporation, It is wholly artificial; and made, like all other legal fictions, by
common agreement. What the particular nature of that agreement was, is collected from
the form into which the particular society has been cast.
Perhaps rude, there, makes some slight difference, but what is most striking is the coexistence of
that common idea, a state of nature, with the almost unnoticed because so habitual use of nature
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to indicate the inherent quality of the agreement. That sense of nature as the inherent and essential
quality of any particular thing is, of course, much more than accidental. Indeed there is evidence
that it is historically the earliest use. In Latin one would have said natura rerum, keeping nature to
the essential quality and adding the definition of things. But then also in Latin natura came to be
used on its own, to express the same general meaning: the essential constitution of the world. Many
of the earliest speculations about nature seem to have been in this sense physical, but with the
underlying assumption that in the course of the physical inquiries one was discovering the
essential, inherent and indeed immutable laws of the world. The association and then the fusion of
a name for the quality with a name for the things observed has a precise history. It is a central
formation of idealist thought. What was being looked for in nature was an essential principle. The
multiplicity of things, and of living processes, might then be mentally organized around a single
essence or principle: a nature.
Now I would not want to deny, I would prefer to emphasize, that this singular abstraction was a
major advance in consciousness. But I think we have got so used to it, in a nominal continuity over
more than two millennia, that we may not always realize quite all that it commits us to. A singular
name for the real multiplicity of things and living processes may be held, with an effort, to be
neutral, but I am sure it is very often the case that it offers, from the beginning, a dominant kind
of interpretation: idealist, metaphysical, or religious. And I think this is especially apparent if we
look at its subsequent history. From many early cultures we have records of what we would now
call nature spirits or nature gods: beings believed to embody or direct the wind or the sea or the
forest or the moon. Under the weight of Christian interpretation we are accustomed to calling these
gods or spirits pagan: diverse and variable manifestations before the revelation of the one true God.
But just as in religion the moment of monotheism is a critical development, so, in human responses
to the physical world, is the moment of a singular Nature.
Singular, Abstracted and Personified
When Nature herself, as people learnt to say, became a goddess, a divine Mother, we had
something very different from the spirits of wind and sea and forest and moon. And it is all the
more striking that this singular abstracted and often personified principle, based on responses to
the physical world, had of course (if the expression may be allowed) a competitor, in the singular,
abstracted and personified religious being: the monotheistic God. The history of that interaction is
immense. In the orthodox western medieval world a general formula was arrived at, which
preserved the singularity of both: God is the first absolute, but Nature is His minister and deputy.
As in many other treaties, this relationship went on being controversial. There was a long
argument, preceding the revival of systematic physical inquiry-what we would now call science-as
to the propriety and then the mode of this inquiry into a minister, with the obvious question of
whether the ultimate sovereignty was being infringed or shown insufficient respect. It is an old
argument now, but it is interesting that when it was revived in the nineteenth century, in the
arguments about evolution, even men who were prepared to dispense with the first singular
principle-to dispense with the idea of God- usually retained and even emphasized that other and
very comparable principle: the singular and abstracted, indeed still often and in some new ways
personified, Nature.
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Perhaps this does not puzzle others as much as it puzzles me. But I might mention at this stage one
of its evident practical effects. In some serious argument, but even more in popular controversy
and in various kinds of contemporary rhetoric, we continually come across propositions of the
form 'Nature is. .. ', or 'Nature shows. . .', or 'Nature teaches. .. '. And what is usually apparent about
what is then said is that it is selective, according to the speaker's general purpose. 'Nature is. . .
' -what? Red in tooth and claw; a ruthlessly competitive struggle for existence; an extraordinary
interlocking system of mutual advantage; a paradigm of interdependence and cooperation.
And 'Nature is' any one of these things according to the processes we select: the food-chain,
dramatized as the shark or the tiger; the jungle of plants competing for space and light and air; or
the pollinator-the bee and the butterfly-or the symbiote and the parasite; even the scavenger, the
population controller, the regulator of food supplies. In what is now seen so often as the physical
crisis of our world many of us follow, with close attention, the latest reports from those who are
observing and qualified to observe these particular processes and effects, these creatures and things
and acts and consequences. And I am prepared to believe that one or other of the consequent
generalizations may be more true than the rest, may be a better way of looking at the processes in
which we also are involved and on which we can be said to depend. But I am bound to say I would
feel in closer touch with the real situation if the observations, made with great skill and precision,
were not so speedily gathered-I mean, of course, at the level of necessary generalization-into
singular statements of essential, inherent and immutable characteristics; into principles of a
singular nature. I have no competence to speak directly of any of these processes, but to put it as
common experience: when I hear that nature is a ruthless competitive struggle I remember the
butterfly, and when I hear that it is a system of ultimate mutual advantage I remember the cyclone.
Intellectual armies may charge each other repeatedly with this or that selected example; but my
own inclination is to ponder the effects of the idea they share: that of a singular and essential
nature, with consistent and reconcilable laws. Indeed I find myself reflecting at this point on the
full meaning of what I began by saying: that the idea of nature contains an extraordinary amount
of human history. What is often being argued, it seems to me, in the idea of nature is the idea of
man, and this not only generally, or in ultimate ways, but the idea of man in society, indeed the
ideas of kinds of societies.
For the fact that nature was made singular and abstract, and was personified, has at least this
convenience: that it allows us to look, with unusual clarity, at some quite fundamental
interpretations of all our experience. Nature may indeed he a single thing or a force or a principle,
but then what these are has a real history. I have already mentioned Nature the minister of God.
To know Nature was to know God, although there was radical controversy about the means of
knowing: whether by faith, by speculation, by right reason, or by physical inquiry and experiment.
But Nature the minister or deputy was preceded and has been widely succeeded by Nature the
absolute monarch. This is characteristic of certain phases of fatalism, in many cultures and periods.
It is not that Nature is unknowable: as subjects we know our monarch. But his powers are so great,
and their exercise at times so apparently capricious, that we make no pretensions to control….
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Ideas of Nature

This schema, which builds on Williams (1980) helps to keep distinct:
•

nature vs. "nature" distinct (column 2 vs. columns 3 & 4)

•

literal ideas about nature vs. ideas interpreted in terms of favored the social order (col. 3 vs. 4)

•

untouched by human activity vs. including human activity (row 2 vs. rows 3 & 4)
Peter Taylor 10/95, revised 3/99
nature = actual
physical, material
(incl. living) world

read literally (right
way for us to behave
or for society to be
ordered; or we can
expect problems if
we deviate; or we
better be careful if
we choose to
deviate)

interpreted
(invoking external
authority is a way
to avoid debating
social issues head
on)
•tells us about
favored social order &
actions plus

•provides/d
potential "natural
resources"
•decreasing -> very
little left now

•natural resources
determine social/
econ. possibilities
•"tells us about how
things work without
human influence
impinging"

•suppresses history
of human laboring
and differentiation*

humans
buffeted by
non-human
forces, e.g.,
in past or
prehistoric
times, or w/
extreme
events

•much human-made
transformation
through history and
even in prehistory
•very little
unambiguous
evidence about prehistoric human social
arrangements

"where society's
influence has not
mitigated such forces
we can learn about
what's natural, incl.
human nature"

•discounts history
of human laboring
and differentiation*

humans
dominating,
e.g., in
industrialized
societies

•ever intensifying
transformations of
non-human realm
and of human
biology
•very little
unambiguous
evidence about
behavioral or social
universals

"biology/ human
nature constrains/
predisposes behavior
in the full range of
social/ economic
activities"

•the emphasis on
behavioral universals
& humans as a
species discounts
differences and ongoing differentiation
among social groups
& societies*

untouched
by human
activity

including
human
activity

“nature” = idea about nature

* & the role of States
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Williams (1980) represented in a historical timeline
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Nature, a conversation
Preface
Ideas of nature underlie a great deal of social thought and have done so through
recorded history. The changing meanings of "nature" and the tensions among coexisting meanings have been analyzed brilliantly by the English cultural analyst
Raymond Williams; he shows us a history readable in terms of the social order being
defended or promoted.* The romantic ideal, for example, of a unspoiled places and
sentiments (i.e., nature separate from "man") arose at a time when industrialization was
rapidly escalating exploitation of people and natural resources (i.e., producing
unprecedented interdependencies among peoples and nature), exploitation underwritten
by the removal of traditional checks in the name, ironically, of the natural principles of
individual autonomy and of unconstrained pursuit of utility in social transactions.
Following Williams, whenever we hear the environment and its conservation being
talked about we should factor into our interpretations the social concerns and socialhistorical location of those who hold those ideas. The recent literature on conservation
efforts in colonial Africa and India, for example, has been revealing vividly how
policies and actions to preserve species and habitats were greatly motivated by
anxieties about changes back in the metropole and by the need to assign "primitive"
peoples some less threatening place in the colonial order.
From Taylor, P. and R. García-Barrios. 1995. "The social analysis of ecological
change." Social Science Information, 34: 5-30.
*Williams, R. 1980. "Ideas of Nature," in Problems of Materialism and Culture.
London: Verso, 67-85.
Suppose we want students to consider how, for example, the valorization by the romantics of
untouched (non-human) nature might be interpreted in terms of the romantics' need to turn the
attention away from the industrialization and colonial exploitation of which many of them
were beneficiaries. It's too much to ask students to jump straight into advancing their own
social interpretations of claims about "nature." First they have to get comfortable with the very
idea of exposing what is not literally stated what people state only when prodded, and then
not all the time. The following conversation: i) develops this idea of interpretation in a
dialogue; ii) allows students to go through and mark where they don't understand the response
given or where different responses could be given; and iii) provides a start—the first five
statements—from which students could write their own trialogues.
Partovo ("Humans are a Part Of nature"): Humans are living organisms. As such they are part
of nature. Therefore, everything they do is natural.
Separato ("Humans have become Separate from nature"): People have lost touch with nature
and that is why our environment and our society are in trouble.
Interpreto ("Interpret Socially views about nature and what is natural"): When I hear people
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draw lessons from nature, I hear them really telling me something about their views on
society.
Separato: You'll have to explain this interpretation to me, because, without a sense of what is
natural and what is unnatural, anything is acceptable.
Interpreto: But Partovo has a sense of what is natural that tells him everything is acceptable.
Separato: Is that right?
Partovo: Yes.
Separato: So you mean mad cow disease, polio, AIDS, and so on are acceptable?
Partovo: Um, yes. We could look at them as forms of population control for the human
species.
Separato: So you wouldn't invest in research for AIDS treatments?
Partovo: No. And I don't think the government should either. AIDS affects mostly gays and IV
drug users. Their practices do not meet widely held community standards and so they don't
deserve society's help.
Separato: I think you are out of date about who gets AIDS. But, putting that aside, I thought
you said anything humans do is natural and thus acceptable.
Partovo: Well, not everything.
Separato: So, what is and what is not?
Partovo: Look, I overstated my position. What I do know is that it is not consistent for
environmentalists to argue that draining wetlands disturbs the balance of nature, while putting
out forest fires to keep a national park scenic is OK.
Separato: I think that the National Park Service is reconsidering its fire policy -- whether it is
better to do preventative control burning or not; whether to allow lightning fires to burn or not.
Partovo: So humans get to decide what kind of (non-human) nature is the one they want?
Separato: Not in any arbitrary way; forest ecologists use the best science available to advise
the NPS on this.
Partovo: "Scientists know best" -- I thought your line was that we'd lost touch with nature, not
that we needed to listen more to scientists. But now I think about it, you did support research
for an AIDS vaccine, right? So you don't mind if scientists intervene to limit interaction
between humans and (non-human) nature in the case of the HIV virus. In what ways exactly
do you want us to regain touch with nature?
Separato: I guess I also overstated my position. Basically what I want to say is that we have to
remember that we're dependent on foodchains for much of our food, plants for our planet's
oxygen, microorganisms inside us to digest our food well, and..
Partovo:... microorganisms for our beer, bread, sewerage treatment works, and thus clean
water. Or do you think these processes are unnatural because humans have harnessed them for
our own purposes?
Interpreto: Can I interrupt here? Separato, are you concerned by the fact that your reasons for
getting in touch with nature are couched in terms of benefits to humans, and are not for the
sake of (non-human) nature?
Separato: I am concerned for non-human nature. Moreover, I'd like to break down the
distinction. That is, in the long term I would like humans to live as if they are one part of
nature among many other interconnected parts. However, I have learned through experience
that most people will pay more attention to the environment only if I give them reasons in
terms of human benefits.
Partovo: You want humans and non-humans to be all part of nature. This sounds like the
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position I began with. And in this unified picture harnessing microorganisms becomes natural,
no?
Separato: You are giving me a hard time. Yes, beer, bread, etc. are OK. But don't slip back to
claiming that everything human technology produces is OK. Oil spills, for example, kill
animals, devastate fishersies and that, in turn , threatens the livelihoods of fishing people.
Partovo: Biotechnology is producing oil-spill cleanup bacteria.
Separato: I think it would be better to prevent oil spills in the first place.
Partovo: Maybe, but I'm not certain. Energy is vital to the economy. If oil companies were
more heavily regulated and energy prices rose as a result, the economy would grow more
slowly -- and probably lose out to countries that accepted a greater risk of oil spills.
Separato: It wouldn't be so bad if economic growth were slower.
Partovo: I suspected you might say that. But think -- if the economy grew slower, there'd be
less money for R&D. And we'd be less likely to develop the efficient solar cells and fusion
power we need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In other words, the risk of oil spills may
be just what we have to accept if we are to eliminate CO2 greenhouse problems.
Separato: You're making a lot of unsupported assumptions about where oil companies invest
profits, whether the promise of fusion power is worth investing more and more billions, and so
on.
Partovo: I trust corporations to invest their profits well to make new profits. And I, like you,
expect that science can produce results.
Separato: I don't have as much faith in corporate-driven R&D as you do. Or in Big Science
such as nuclear fusion. Priorities for research should be for health and ecological sustainability
-- and not for military might or corporate profit. I mean, have you read the figures for the costs
of containment and cleanup of wastes, chemical and nuclear, put into the environments around
military installations since WWII?
Partovo: I concede that mistakes may have been made, but the military didn't only produce
nuclear weapons and toxic wastes. Many technologies that you rely on are spinoffs from
military R&D.
Separato: Like teflon? I could do without that!
Partovo: How about computers and the internet. Have you used email to organize an
environmental campaign lately?
Separato: OK -- there are some benefits I accept, but go back to the costs. Someone will have
to pay these, and that's going to be a big drag on the economic growth you favor.
Partovo: Maybe the costs won't be so great if we just abandon the areas and let nature take its
course.
Separato: Not everyone can pack up and move away from toxic-contaminated sites.
Partovo: Agreed. But you should remember that some people move into such areas when the
price of real estate drops to levels they can afford. That's the way markets work to balance
supply and demand. Dare I say, it's a natural process?
Interpreto: I suspected you would. And by that thinking it's then natural or, one might say,
acceptable, that the people who move into the area suffer the health costs, while the
corporations that secured the military R&D contracts gain the profits. The general point I want
to make is that almost everything that both of you has said in trying to defend your views
about nature has been based on your views about acceptable vs. unacceptable aspects of
society. So, Separato, I don't think "nature" holds up as a point of reference for deciding what's
acceptable or not.
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Separato: But if not nature, what else?
Interpreto: You've already told us what -- for you it's human health and ecological
sustainability; for Partovo, it's economic growth, with risks that can be distributed unequally
among groups within society.
Partovo: I might observe that the notion that we can plan for ecological sustainability in a
complex world sounds as full of "unsupported assumptions" as Separato criticized me for
having with respect to economic growth and technological development.
Interpreto: Right -- I'm glad Separato's point sunk in enough for you to wield it in return....
Separato, you're looking perplexed. What are you thinking?
Separato: I know ecology is complex, all the more so when humans are involved -- as is
almost always the case. And I admit that I invoke simple ideas such as "draining wetlands
disturbs the balance of nature." But I do this to grab attention. Once I have it, I can point out
the decline of waterbird and migrating bird populations and get people interested in checking
development. I just wouldn't get to first base if I said, "I'm against development."
Partovo: And you're not against all development, either. I think you like national parks to be
fenced off from farms and for those parks to be managed so that campers don't destroy the
forests, kill the animals, pollute the lakes...
Separato: And you're not for all development either. I think you like the vacations I've heard
you take on the clean uncrowded beaches of Cuba.
Partovo: (Sheepishly) And I've also enjoyed going with my family on nature tours in the
Amazon and in Kenya.
Separato: But, back to my worry. I have to reduce complexity if I'm going to get attention and
enlist people into a campaign. It's not until we have people involved that we can even get
research done on the ecological dynamics -- to establish how vulnerable the wetland is; how
quickly it could recover from stress; whether we can create a new wetland on land developers
don't want. And that's just the research needed on the ecological dynamics. Imagine if I had to
research the economic costs and benefits before raising my concerns!
Partovo: You could rely on developers to assess the costs and benefits. They wouldn't go
ahead if they were likely to take a loss.
Separato: There you go again -- you forget that corporations make sure that they don't carry all
the costs. They displace some on to other people and rely on not having to pay for loss of
wildlife populations when development destroys the animals' habitats.
Partovo: OK, but let me echo your concerns. If we had to assess all the costs -- present and
future, social and environmental -- of proposed projects, it'd take years before we could
advance on new industry and other development. The economy would be greatly constrained.
And we all need a vibrant economy.
Separato: We don't all benefit equally and some bear greater costs...
Partovo: ... OK. OK. But that's unavoidable. Anyway, egregious abuses eventually lead to
reform legislation and government regulation.
Interpreto: That seems a very coarse way to take environmental and health costs into account.
In fact, you're both claiming that analyses of ecological, health, and economic dynamics are
too complex to be the basis of social decision making. This appears to be a claim about how
the real world works. I know you're not refering to nature -- trees, animals, etc. -- but just as I
said at the start about ideas of nature, these ideas about the "real world" build in ideas about
your favored social arrangements.
Partovo & Separato: Huh?
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Interpreto: You're assuming, for example, that some participatory form of on-going planning
and assessment is not possible. The absence of this possibility then warrants Partovo trusting
corporate and military decision makers to balance benefits and costs, and warrants Separato
resorting to dramatic rhetoric -- "Act now to save the wetlands!"
Separato: And you think that such participatory planning is possible. That explains why you
point to the unspoken messages behind our statements -- you want to check the power of
simple accounts of the ecological and social world and counter the rhetoric of crisis
management that gets associated with those accounts.
Interpreto: Touch .
Partovo: I'm getting dizzy. You're interpreting our statements in terms of social views and
commitments that we didn't state...
Interpreto: Or, at least, only started stating when prodded...
Partovo: OK. And now Separato is saying that this very interpretive stance of yours is itself
subject to non-literal interpretation?
Separato: It's even more complicated than that. Interpreto has faith in the ability of people to
understand complex processes and participate in decisions about investment and social policy.
So he seeks to undermine our approaches and their implications about social action and to
boost his approach. We're all involved in intervening in social processes. Therefore, we should
examine empirically whether my environmentalist rhetoric, Partovo's developmentalist
rhetoric, or Interpreto's critical interpretations of us have the most impact.
Furthermore, Interpreto, if you prefer the more complex, why do you focus on interpreting our
more simple statements? Instead you should present to us some complex accounts of particular
cases. At the very least, to help me get beyond "do not disturb natural balance" type rhetoric, I
would like to know what ecological and social principles can guide our interventions with/in
nature.
While I'm on this roll, I think it would be better if you -- together with a group of collaborators
-- demonstrated on-going, participatory planning and assessment. Or else, we would be
justiied in interpreting your emphasis to date on critical interpretations as indicating your
confidence in the political impact of ideas, words, and text. Could it be that practice is
secondary in your framework?
Interpreto: I think you're both right to challenge me. Raymond Williams' life's work -- and I
have been taking him as a model today -- focused on literature and politics. The correlations
he draws between ideas people have about social and natural arrangements -- I am impressed
by them. But he does leave me wondering what people actually do so as to end up with such
connected ideas. I'd like him to say more about the social interactions and negotiations through
which humans come to know the world.
Partovo: I hate this -- now you are distancing yourself from your role model. Can't we keep
this simple?
Interpreto: Yes and no. Let me observe that in this discussion a Williams-type perspective has
opened up questions you had been avoiding, and it has exposed assumptions you were taking
for granted. In this light, even if simple rhetoric and accounts -- "(non-human) nature is in
fragile balance"; "economic processes adjust investment and R&D choices to respond to costs
and demands" -- are sometimes powerful, wouldn't it be better to have a more complex
account to complement that? Furthermore, suppose you were simply committed to mobilizing
people to act (or, in Partovo's case to let corporate managers act for them), I think more
complex accounts would be needed to help you understand when the simple rhetoric will be
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powerful. That isn't always the case. And, even when it is, simplicity sometimes engenders
unintended, undesirable consequences.
Separato: Hold on. I understand the undesirable consequences of Partovo's accounts -- they
help distract help corporations and the military avoid paying the full costs of their projects. But
what are the undesirable consequences of drawing attention to the environmental costs of
development?
Partovo: Let me answer. Environmentalist rhetoric, especially of the apocalyptic kind,
undermines people's commitment to working hard to keep the economy thriving.
Interpreto: Maybe, but that's not what I had in mind. I suggest that you wait for Peter Taylor's
classes on neo-Malthusians, the so-called "tragedy of the commons," and global models to see
how environmental rhetoric can have undesirable consequences.
Separato: OK, I'll wait. But let me admit that I'm worried by where you're leading us with your
critical interpretations of ideas about nature. I now doubt your earlier reassurances that I have
some alternative points of reference, namely, health and ecological sustainability. If one
shifted to more complex analyses, health and ecological sustainability would start unraveling
too. We would be left without any firm handholds.
Interpreto: I don't think that must be the case. But, to convince you of that, words and
arguments are of limited power. I believe that we'd have to join in and experience some
participatory processes of social governance.
Partovo: We already do -- we all vote in elections, right? I know that voters aren't all
informing themselves with analyses of "complex ecological, health, and economic dynamics"
as you call them. But voters elect representatives whose decision making takes into account
the advice of those to whom they delegate the tasks of analysis.
Separato: You must know that that is a seriously idealized picture of how decisions are made
in government.
Partovo: Maybe, but tell me: Would you be happy if we moved towards this ideal of social
decision making by elected representatives following the advice of environmental analysts?
Would you -- or Interpreto for that matter -- accept an appointment as such an analyst?
Separato: I don't know.
Interpreto: I'm afraid we're too far from that ideal for me to make a well-informed response.
Partovo: It's easier to be a critical interpreter of the messy present, isn't it?
Interpreto: Yes, but I think there's more to learn from our conversation than that...
Peter Taylor, 10/97, slightly revised 2/99
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Rethinking nature/culture
Nature/culture distinctions play out in many different and contradictory ways. In turn, there
are multiple rethinkings. The list below began with some that arose or lurked around during
the 1996-97 Rutgers University seminar on "Rethinking nature/culture." Please add to and play
with the list. Play is important because, even if we reject certain of the dualisms, the ones we
accept are probably infected with resonances from the others.
N = Nature, natural, universal,.environment..
C = culture, artificial, particular,.society..
R = ways the divide has been rethought
OQ = open questions remaining from or raised by the rethinking
1.
N = markets
C = non-market residue in social relations ("market failure")
R = real markets are always embedded in political-economic relations
2. anti-toxics
N = (health of) human bodies
C = chemical ("toxic wastes")
3. environmental justice
N = political-economic processes are common to all societies & fractions of society
C = communities, having specific identities, are specifically targetted
4.
N = global integration
C = local resistance
5. in the appeals of environmental movements:
N = (non-human) nature, which has lessons for us
C = people, out of touch with (non-human) nature
R = experience at the frontier (i.e., at the periphery of society and in touch with non-human
nature) enhances a person's ability to intervene back at the center, in modernization (Quiroga),
and in family, nation, empire (T. Roosevelt)
6a. continuous
C = culture is part of
N = universal nature (and thus N is relevant to social concerns)
6b. discontinuous
N = force external to culture (and thus a source of cultural authority)
R = culture & nature continuous & discontinuous (Kovel & Smith)
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7.
N = human bodies & non-human nature, dominated by
C = technology
R for 5,6 & 7 (R. Williams)
Ideas about nature, naturalness & universality are projections of ideas about favored social
order. The authority of these ideas is a socially maintained device, with a definite history
tracing back to a human/ divine divide
8.
N = self-interested rationality
C = particular norm-governed behavior
R= sometimes one, sometimes the other -- it's a contingent & pragmatic matter (A. Vayda)
OQ = when one; when the other? is there any underlying sense to this?
Another R = norms can be traced back to self-interested rationality (iterative, evolutionary
game theory)
9.
N = oral ("natural language")
C = text
10.
N = unmarked (by race, gender,...)
C = marked
11.
N = Life
C = Human intelligence & language
R = Replicating informatic devices (Santa Fe Institute)
12.
N = Replicating informatic devices
C = ? (is anything residual to the above?)
13a.
N = Female
C = Male
13b.
N = Other cultures. primitives
C = Euro-, white, advanced
R = drag & whiteface transgress these divides
OQ = but they also reinforce the dichotomies
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14.
N = adaptive, self-regulating
C = disordered, crisis-prone
15.
N = simple
C = complex
16.
N = infants & children
C = adults
17.
N = dependent
C = autonomous
18.
N = insane
C = sane
19.
N = children and equal opportunity
C = adults and choice of hazardous jobs
20.
N = markets allocating adults to hazardous jobs & localities
C = protecting children from harm not of their own choice
21.
N = rights to liberty
C = rules constraining children
22.
N = foundations to morals, knowledge
C = all is discursive practices
R = contingent foundations (J. Butler)
23.
N = focus of conservation & preservation campaigns
C = resource management and use
Peter Taylor, 1997
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The structure of origin stories
1. Introduction
•

The Ideas of Nature chapter introduced the idea that interpretation exposes what is only implicit in an
account. This chapter interprets story-telling, focusing on origin stories both outside science and
inside.

•

Story tellers select elements and arrange them in a sequence. Selection and arrangement simplify
the complexity of influences needing to be considered to understand the outcome and cover over the
uncertain or unknowable information. The story-teller not only gives emphasis or credence to the
outcome, but can also try to make plausible the causality implied in the story.

•

Stories are more compelling if they adopt a familiar structure and if they resonate with other stories.

•

The influence of structural (or structuring) themes can be seen by identifying them and asking what
would happen to the account if an opposing or alternative theme were employed.

•

Playing one theme off against another and creating some interpretive tension is an example of critical
thinking in the sense of understanding ideas or practice better by holding them in tension with
alternatives.

•

Origin stories are important because they are used to make sense of and often to justify the state of
affairs we find ourselves in now.

•

Many scientific accounts can be read as stories or narratives (Landau as described in Lewin),
especially when
1. they attempt to deal with uncertain or unknowable information, e.g., in accounts of origins—
meaning both the point of origin and the subsequent history—and evolution; or
2. with many connections and causes rather than a few experimentally controlled factors.

1b. Mini-lecture
•

Initial questions: Why tell stories? How do stories get to be memorable and persuasive? Why are
origins important? Why do we tell stories to explain origins?

•

Examine first chapter of Genesis (King James version) to introduce the idea of looking for themes that
structure biological accounts, especially those used to explain origins and the history of life.
o

Schema

•

Additional question: Is story-telling an acceptable part of science?

•

An invented account of the origin of human intelligence that employs non-standard structuring
themes.
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2. Readings
Hrdy, S. B. (1981). "An Initial Inequality". Pp. 20-23 in The Woman That Never Evolved. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press
Precis TBA
Lewin, R. (1987). "The storytellers". Pp. 30-46 in Bones of contention: Controversies in the search for
human origins. New York: Simon & Schuster
•

Precis TBA

Martin, E. (1991). "The egg and the sperm: How science has constructed a romance based on
stereotypical male-female roles." Signs 16(3): 485-501.
•

Precis TBA

Full versions: See password-protected readings
•

Locate 1 or 2 accounts in textbooks or elsewhere of either a) sperm and egg production; b) the
passage to fertilization; or c) contact and fusion. Do the accounts you find reinforce or depart from
Martin’s analysis of gender bias? Do they fit Landau’s structure of stories told about human evolution
(as described in Lewin)? Come to class prepared to discuss these questions.

•

Come with ideas and questions about how to extract the themes that structure Hrdy's account of the
origin of sex differences.

3. Activity
Based on preparation above, pairwise discussion of Martin's interpretation and analysis of structure of
Hrdy, followed by whole-class discussion.
(Time permitting) Given that sometimes we describe our lives in a linear narrative; sometimes we
emphasize its multiple strands, contingency, etc., reflect on the different situations in which you use the
different themes to organize your life descriptions.

4. Synthesis and extensions
Why do we tell stories?
•

See introduction. More answers TBA.

How do stories get to be memorable and persuasive?
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•

One answer is when they are biased in ways we accept (see discussion of bias). More answers TBA.

Why are origins important?
•

Why not simply start from where you are? Possible answer: Because origins connect the present to
the future, that is, to who we are and where we are going. That is, origin stories can be read as
explanations and explanations as justifications.

Is story-telling an acceptable part of science?
TBA
Structural themes in stories /narratives /historical accounts
Stories are more compelling if they adopt a familiar structure (see Landau's structuralist account) and if
they resonate with other stories (the hermeneutic emphasis). Identifying the structural themes and
noticing connections between parts highlights the causation implied and perhaps exposes weaknesses in
the account. For example, Hrdy’s uses four dualities that at first seem to reinforce each other—
large/small cell, egg/sperm, “female”/”male” unicell, female/male mammal—but then allow us to ask what
is anything the relationship is say between a sperm and a male. After all, sperm can carry an X or a Y
chromosome. To pursue critical thinking around structural themes, use the pairings to reflect on how the
story could appear if the other theme in the pair had been emphasized.
•

Note: Stories may be only part of explanations or arguments, so, when trying to see which of the themes
below inform or structure an account, concentrate on the historical part and its end-point—the outcome
that the account is trying to make understandable. The rest of the author's exposition may provide
evidence for, or render plausible, various elements of the story, but this is a secondary issue. Also, an
account may work in more than one structural theme.
A. In each of the following the first theme is more common in biology and allied social thinking, while the
second is an alternative that is more open and difficult to analyze:
1. linearity one person or entity is the central subject followed through the course of the story, inc. life
course maturation;.
(A chain of if-then connections does not necessarily make a narrative linear because the story can be
weaving together several different types of phenomena, i.e. not just following one entity.)
vs. multiple strands (in the one story -- multiple explanations of the same phenomenon don’t
necessarily make an account non-linear.)
(Even if different phenomena enter the story without much background being given to them, consider
what they entail. For example, in the speculative account of the origin of human intelligence the basic
tendency of primates to be social was assumed in having the early humans stay and care for the
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premature babies, rather than leaving them to die. This then constitutes another strand woven into the
story )
2. development - unfolding - essential trajectory everything, including the endpoint, is implied from
the outset -- if you have an egg you'll eventually get an adult chicken -- if you have a society you'll
inevitably have it modernize, democratize, etc. Of course, not everything fits, but the deviations are
mere deviations from the ideal course.
vs. critical interventions along the way (by Gods, heroes, random mutations) move things along
3. progress everything is climbing ever higher, getting better, or the opposite, regress -- everything is
getting worse, declining from the Golden Age of the past.
vs. simply change most of what happens doesn't contribute to the final outcome, e.g. Ediacaran fauna
& Burgess shale do not contribute genealogically to present taxa
4. directional, even determined very few steps from start to outcome, or very few opportunities for
anything different to have happened. Includes Whig history (= the past is presented so that the present is
made to seem a necessary consequence of it ) -- it's hard to see any other directions things could have
gone (side-branches, failures, etc.)
vs. contingent and thus winding, branching path -- lots of places for things to have gone another way dicey connections between events and “quirky changes” (the path to the end-point is windy, not direct)
5. adapted, fit to situation current function seems so good, even optimal or perfect, that the story
doesn't have to fill in much history of how it came to be
vs. constructed many strands come together or coalesce to produce an outcome, which is thus open to
change at many points in the process. “Characters = genes plus environment” is a very weak form of
construction, especially if the central thread of the story is genetic, leaving the environment just a
modifier of the result.
6. gradual & continuous steady accumulation:"evolution not revolution"
vs. episodic, even catastrophic bursts of activity or happenings, e.g. Cambrian radiation, postMesozoic radiations of birds and mammals
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7. naturalism human social behavior and arrangements are natural, i.e. do not need specifically social
explanation
vs. humanism explain humans in specifically human terms (see also B8 below).
8. dualisms categories come in pairs (e.g., homosexual/heterosexual; male/female)
vs. multiplicities divisions into two types obscures a lot of diversity (e.g., variants of sexual preference)

B. In each of the following the themes are equally common and often co-exist in tension within the one
account (we’ll say more about these themes in later classes):
1. uniformityinsist on invoking the same causes then (in the past) as you see now
vs. historically located unique causes, or causes that need reference to the particular situation and
timing, i.e., events wouldn't be true in all times or places
2. balance of nature(see also adapted, stability)
vs. struggle for existence necessarily involving sub-optimality and imperfection (at least transiently)
3. fixed, stable places, niches
vs. scramble for a place
4. stable equilibrium
vs. change
5. biological causes of changing conditions of life
vs. physical/ climatic determination
6. Nature integrated, like an organism
vs. aggregate of individuals
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7. Nature passive
vs. active, creative
8. anthropomorphism depicting non-humans (living or non-living) in terms of human motivations,
emotions, social arrangements, etc.
vs. naturalism human social behavior and arrangements follow the same rules as the rest of nature.
(These themes can reinforce each other if the idea of what’s natural is anthropomorphized.)
9. Parallels and borrowing (e.g., Hrdy’s small/large cell = sperm/egg = male/female mammals)
vs. Unique and singular (e.g., explaining differentiation of cell size in ancient unicells, anisogamy in
germ cells, and size-activity differentials in mammals each by different means)

An activity: Refer to the structural themes above to analyze E.O. Wilson's (1980, 279) story about the
evolution of human homosexuality, which is preceded and followed by other points relevant to his
account, http://bit.ly/XHsxgi (starting end of first column).

5. Connections and resources
5b. Add to this blog post to make contributions to the revision of the chapter above or to an annotated
collection of readings and other resources related to the chapter.
5c. Adaptation of themes from the chapter to students' own projects of engaging others in learning or
critical thinking about biology in its social context. Suggestions:
i. Identify the leading or dominant explanation or account of some issue that is important in the area of
your project. Identify the structural themes used. Invent an alternative account that emphasizes the
alternatives to the structural themes. e.g., emphasizing the key role of contingency instead of a directional
account.
ii. Same as i, but instead of inventing the alternative, look for one already published or promoted by
someone in the area.
iii. Brainstorm with instructor
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An invented account of the origin of human intelligence that employs non-standard structuring themes.
As a preliminary, keep in mind that in placental mammals most neural connections are made before
birth.
In a small group of our hominid ancestors a mutation that affected developmental timing occurred and
spread by genetic drift through the group. The effect of this mutation was to prolong the period,
characteristic of mammalian fetuses, in which relative growth rate of the brain is greater than the
growth rate of the body. The immediate effect of this was to increase the brain size at birth making
births more difficult than before. Individuals who were born early and thus smaller (and their mothers)
tended to survive better. The premature individuals, however, needed care -- they weren't able to hang
on for themselves, move around, and so on for some months. Their caregivers tended to remain more
on the ground and more sedentary during this time, enhancing both the level of face-to-face interaction
(the parents’ hands being free from holding on to branches) and the level of social interaction involving
and surrounding the babies. The babies having been born premature, however, meant that this was
just the period when neural connections were being set down. The neural connections then reflected
this high level of social interaction, whereas other placental fetuses experience mostly the physical
environment of the womb while their connections are being set down. The sophistication and flexibility
of these post-birth neural connections accounts for human intelligence.
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Bias has a range of associations
Let us distinguish bias and Bias
bias
1. X's bias leads them to accept assumptions and propositions without examining alternatives.
2. The assumptions and propositions are one set of elements in the construction of scientific knowledge
from many elements building upon each other. That is, all work is biased. (Image: biased bowls)
vs. Experimental tests and peer review eliminate bias in science. (This view assumes, incorrectly, that all
alternatives are raised and considered in normal science.)
3. 1=> Use the assertion that X is biased to counterpose alternative, and ask what difference it makes in
examples cited, observations made, arguments addressed and conclusions reached. That is, bias,
provides an entry point for further investigation.
4. 2=> We should not expect bias to determine the outcome.
5. 2=> Changing biased work will require changing many interconnected elements.
vs. Bias
6. Bias = accusation that X's bias is determining, that changing it would make all the difference, because
everything is built upon that.
7. Accusations of Bias arise in two ways:
•

a) Status quo-ers have the power to discount their own biases—they are normal—while others who
question and advocate specific change are Biased -- they deviate from the normal;

•

b) Critics of the status quo attempt to reconstruct all the interconnected elements (see 5)—to grab
attention, gain new audiences, develop constituency with shared assumptions upon which further work
can build, etc.
8. 7b-ers run the risk of provoking a response from 7a-ers and of selectivity, which makes them
vulnerable to 7a-ers.
Which biases should we identify and work through?

•

Start with pervasive biases, e.g., gender (whether or not you see pervasive gender Bias).

•

Use theme 3 above.

•

Correctives, e.g., eliminating masculine generics from language.
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Multiple layers in influencing an audience: The case of Darwin's On
the Origin of Species
1. Introduction
Having been sensitized to the story telling aspect of scientific writing, to the dominant structural themes
adopted in accounts or origins, and to the ideas of nature that were invoked before Darwin to support
ideas of the social order (whether that was the actual, idealised, or desired order), we are now in a better
position to read Darwin and interpret his ideas on evolution and on the means by which it occurs.
•

Williams's account of the history of ideas of nature conveys a general trend: Ever increasing
interaction of societies with/in nature -> idea that nature has a history -> evolutionary theories of
nature -> contested issue: do humans evolve too?

•

Darwin's specific contribution: The idea that everything in nature is adapted to its place, but that this is
the result of an on-going struggle for existence, not given by creation once and for all.

•

Broad-brush interpretation of Darwin's idea about how evolution happens: The idea of evolution by
natural selection relates to and supports a dominant idea about social order, namely, that one’s place
in society is a result of a natural process of selection, and, given that the result is adapted, this is
right/ justifiable/ as good as we could hope for.

•

Such an interpretation raises a question: What did Darwin actually do in his scientific research that
resulted in a theory that fits that social interpretation?

1b. Mini-lecture: Given that one of the things Darwin did was write to convince his various audiences, this
lecture introduces 4 layers of argument in Darwin's text and models close reading of the introduction and
part of chapter 1.

2. Reading
Darwin, C. (1859 [1964]). Introduction & Chapters 1, 3, part of 4. In On the Origin of Species. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1-43, 60-96. (Available widely on the internet or via passwordprotected readings.)
This is the first full-length treatment that Darwin published of his theory of natural selection. He is carefully
building up an argument so let us read closely, assuming that everything has a point. In class we will
unpack the multiple layers of a scientific theory, in this case, the argument, analogy, metaphor, and
defences. To prepare for this, make a copy of the following table and fill in the right-hand column as best
you can from your reading.
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Fill in your understanding & provide
quotes that illustrate or support it
Layer 1: premises leading to conclusion that evolution
results in improved adaptation to local conditions
2 majors premises of Chapter 1 & 2
1 major premise of Chapter 3 & its consequence
1 major premise of Chapter 4 & in combination with preceding
premises, its consequence
Layer 2: analogy
Given the lessons of Chapter 1 about selective breeding by
humans, namely,..
then something like selection in nature should be effective
because…
Layer 3: metaphor of Natural Selection
Associations that help readers conceive of this mechanism
working so that evolution results in improved adaptation to local
conditions
Associations that help readers see that what they had learned
from Natural theology can still be explained
Associations that might not work in Darwin’s favor
Layer 4: preemptive defences
Against objections from other naturalists and scientists
Against objections from religious authorities
Other issues or questions you have

3. Activity
Clarify and extend what this scaffolding helped you learn from the reading.

4. Synthesis and extensions
A recapitulation of the early chapters of On the Origin of Species
(from Taylor P. J. 1998. Natural Selection: A heavy hand in biological and social thought. Science as
Culture 7:5-32)
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The Origin is about evolution, about how the diversity of forms we observe are descended from common
ancestors through a series of modifications over time. Darwin's purpose was not merely to establish that
evolution existed; many before him had noted the changes in fossils from one layer to the next. As he
wrote in the introduction, his central problem lay elsewhere:
It is quite conceivable that a naturalist, reflecting on the mutual affinities of organic beings, on
their embryological relations ... and other such facts, might come to the conclusion that each
species had not been independently created, but had descended, like varieties, from other
species. Nevertheless, such a conclusion, even if well founded, would be unsatisfactory, until it
could be shown how the innumerable species inhabiting this world have been modified, so as to
acquire that perfection of structure and coadaptation which most justly excites our admiration (p.
3).
Darwin had to provide a convincing mechanism for evolution, and, moreover that mechanism had to
account for adaptation-such as the long antennae which enable blind cave crayfish to sense their way in
the dark. His contemporaries drew their conventional wisdom from Natural Theology. The adaptation
between organisms and the environment, so marvellous and harmonious, necessitated a designer;
adaptation was evidence of God. Darwin's counterproposal to explain adaptation and evolution was, of
course, natural selection. Given the absence of direct evidence of natural selection actually happening,
however, it was no small task to win his readers over to his theory. So he advanced on argument which
has several layers. The centrepiece of this argument is laid out in his first four chapters which I will
recapitulate in sequence.
In Chapter 1, entitled 'Variation under domestication,' Darwin observed that variation exists in the
characters of organisms such as in the size of udders of cows and goats. Variation never runs out, though
its causes are unclear (Darwin believed that new environments acting on the reproductive system elicited
new variants). Variation existing in parents often appears in offspring, even if it does so imperfectly and
mysteriously, sometimes disappearing only to reappear in later generations, e.g. baldness in grandparent
and grandson. In short, variation among organisms exists and is partially inherited in offspring.
Darwin developed his observations of variation further: Variation can be accumulated. Darwin described
in detail the extreme differences among the runts, tumblers, pouters, and so on at the London Pigeon
Club. Darwin speculated that if ornithologists were to encounter different domestic pigeons back in the
wild they would classify them into different species or even into different genera. Yet, it seems, all
domestic pigeons are modifications of one species of rock pigeon; one ancestor had, over a long period
of time, given rise to all the diversity of descendants. The divergence from the common ancestor was
brought about by humans selecting variants and moulding the lineages of animals to human wants and
fancies. The accumulation of differences occurs in small steps, not all at once. Sometimes the differences
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are imperceptible except to the specialized breeder and may even occur unconsciously. In another
example, Darwin wrote of Mr. Buckley and Mr. Burgess both sincerely striving to breed true from the
same original stock of Mr. Blakewell's Leicester sheep, yet after fifty years their two flock looked quite
different (p. 36). And so, such stories of the effectiveness and gradualness of selection by humans make
up the first chapter of Darwin's book about evolution in nature.
Chapter 2, 'Variation under nature,' can be summarized for our purposes as: variation also exists in
undomesticated species and tends to be reproduced in offspring.
Chapter 3, 'Struggle for existence,' begins with Darwin rewriting Malthus from society into the natural
world. Organisms tend to increase their numbers exponentially; in 500 years one pair of slow breeding
elephants would, Darwin calculated, multiply to 15 million animals. Resources do not, however, match
this increase, so not all offspring can survive. Because of this 'hyperfecundity' (a modern term, not
Darwin's) among the offspring there must be a struggle for existence. Darwin used this term in 'a large
and metaphorical sense' (p. 62). Existence included success in leaving progeny. Struggle included getting
food from other organisms, coping with drought, competing with other animals for food in times of
scarcity, a parasite's finding of a host, and so on. Darwin noted that competition is strongest among
individuals of the same species and in other situations is generally less focussed. Darwin observed,
taking what we would now call an ecological viewpoint, that checks and relations among organisms are
very complex and can produce unexpected results. For example, the introduction of one species, Scotch
fir, into heathland led to the flourishing of many species of plants, insects, and birds not previously seen in
the heath (p.71). Furthermore, as if the harsh connotation of the term struggle needed mitigation, Darwin
began the chapter by reminding the reader about the exquisiteness of adaptations evident in the
'humblest parasite [clinging] to the hairs of a quadruped'(p. 61). And he ended with the wonderful
reassurance that when 'we reflect on this struggle, we may console ourselves with the full belief, that the
war of nature is not incessant, that no fear is felt, that death is generally prompt, and that the vigorous,
the healthy, and the happy survive and multiply' (p. 79).
But, if not all offspring can survive, which survive? Chapter 3 posed this problem; chapter 4, 'Natural
Selection,' resolved it as follows: In the struggle for existence those with favourable variations are
preserved, and those with injurious variations are rejected. Or, in Herbert Spencer's phrase, the fittest
survive. Darwin, however, preferred his name for the process and thoroughly exploited the likeness of
Nature to a Selector:
It may be said that natural selection is daily and hourly scrutinising, throughout the world, every
variation, even the slightest; rejecting that which is bad, preserving and adding up all that is good;
silently and insensibly working, whenever and wherever opportunity offers, at the improvement of
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each organic being in relation to [i.e., in its fit-ness to] its organic and inorganic conditions of life
(p. 84).
Nature the Selector is, he added, immeasurably superior to Man:
Man can act only on external and visible characters: nature cares nothing for appearance, except
in so far as they may be useful to any being. She can act on every internal organ, on every shade
of constitutional difference, on the whole machinery of life. Man selects only for his own good;
Nature only for that of the being which she tends (p. 83).

An interpretation of the layers of Darwin's presentation
(from Taylor P. J. 1998. Natural Selection: A heavy hand in biological and social thought. Science as
Culture 7:5-32)
Now that we have a first reading of Darwin's argument for natural selection as the mechanism for
evolution, let me unpack the multiple layers therein. The first layer is a straightforward deduction. If we
have evidence of variation, inheritance of variation, and hyperfecundity, then there must be a struggle for
existence. And, in the struggle, if those more fit to the conditions of life survive and reproduce, then the
next generation of offspring will on average be better adapted to those conditions. Notice, for I will return
to this later, that this deduction comes in two logical stages.
1) Variation, inheritance and hyperfecundity on their own imply only that there will be differential
representation of variants from one generation to the next. (This could lead nowhere in particular.)
2) Survival (and implicitly reproduction) of the fittest, or natural selection, tends to give us, in addition,
improved adaptation.
The second layer of Darwin's argument is the analogy. Chapter 1 in all its length serves to impress on his
readers that selection is effective under Man. Given that the same elements exist in Nature, and act even
more strongly, selection should, according to the analogy, be effective under Nature.
The third layer is the metaphor of Nature as Selector. Metaphors are devices that animate thinking about
one concept through the connotations of another. What would have been the connotations of a Selector
to Darwin's readers? First, he was appealing to an audience well versed in Natural Theology and the use
of Nature as evidence of God's design. Darwin's mechanism for evolution eliminates the need for a
designer and might seem radically opposed to Natural Theology. However, if Nature were seen as God's
handmaiden, then Darwin could be read quite comfortably as another interpreter of natural laws laid down
by God. Furthermore, English Natural Theology had become decidedly anthropocentric, with God
designing the world for the benefit of humankind-utility was as important as harmony in this design. To an
audience well aware of the active shaping of plants and animals by selective breeding, the invocation of a
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Selector would have rung true. Darwin's audience was also a bourgeois audience, susceptible to appeals
to universal man, and able to use discussion of the abstract rights of all men to insulate itself from the
actuality of industrial and imperial exploitation, slavery, and the subordination of women to men. A unitary
Nature, therefore, resonates with this unitary Man; Natural Selection, in contrast to the decentered,
unfocussed connotations of the term 'survival of the fittest,' cuts through the complexity of checks and
relations to become a singular and abstract force (Williams 1980, see also Young 1985a, 1993).
Such connotations were felt unevenly and with qualifications by Darwin's different contemporaries. The
power of metaphor is precisely that connotations are neither dictated nor unambiguous. Let me add two
other important connotations invoked by Nature as Selector, ones that caused problems for Darwin's
theory. The first is progress. Selective breeding is also called plant (or animal) improvement; selective
improvement is progress. Darwin seemed to recognise, however, that adaptation to local circumstances
did not guarantee unidirectional, global progress. He avoided the term evolution which associated change
with a steady overall improvement. (This connotation persists to this day...) Darwin’s guard slipped in the
Origin only once, when he used 'evolved' in the concluding passage of the book. There he exalted
readers to see not pointlessness in the struggle for existence, but 'grandeur in this view of life' in which,
'from so simple a beginning, endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being,
evolved' (p. 490). However Darwin's contemporaries did not match his caution. Evolution as popularized
by, for example, Spencer in the Anglo world and by Ernst Haeckel in Europe was equated with progress.
We need only think of the common pictures of marching sequences of primates from an ape to a human
(almost always a man), or of the trees of life at whose crown usually the human species, not other
quadrupeds or multicellulars, and never bacteria.
A second problematic connotation of Nature-the-Selector proved most difficult for Darwin's theory. Godthe-designer, the god of Natural Theology, is a god created in the image of Man–conscious and able to
design. Natural Selection, however, proceeds unconsciously. So, if Nature-the-Selector replaces Godthe-designer, the special position of humans in the natural order, next to God, is undermined. Humans
become just another species, perhaps the highest point in evolution, but continuous with other species
and subject to the same laws; in other words, there is a uniformity in nature. Young (1985) argues that the
issue of continuity or uniformity, more than any other issue, led to the lack of acceptance by Darwin's
contemporaries of natural selection as a mechanism of evolution. When the sixth edition of the Origin was
published in 1872 Darwin had hedged significantly from his original exposition, adding mechanisms other
than natural selection to explain adaptation. Most notably, he accepted a significant role in evolution for
the Lamarckian idea that modifications of an organ through use or disuse during the parent's lifetime
could be passed to offspring-an idea, ironically, much closer to human ideas of conscious improvement.
So we see that Darwin's metaphor was very active, and that some of its many connotations were
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problematic for Darwin's contemporaries, and even for Darwin himself (Young 1993). Why, we might ask,
was the metaphoric layer of his argument so prominent? Why not focus, as modern biologists do, on the
first layer I mentioned, the seemingly straightforward deduction? To Darwin the conceptual, scientific
problem was that, although there was evidence for variation, inheritance and hyperfecundity, and
although survival of the fittest seemed eminently plausible, adaptation by natural selection was only a
deduction from these elements–he had no direct evidence for natural selection actually in process. The
lack of evidence accounts for a fourth layer in Darwin's writing–his numerous defensive moves. When in
Chapter 1 he spoke of imperceptible differences, of divergence resulting from a slow and gradual
accumulation of small steps over a long period of time, he was saying, in effect, 'don't expect to see
natural selection happen before your eyes.' And, by stressing the complexity of checks and relations in
the struggle for existence, we can hear him asking readers not to expect him to define exactly what
makes one organism more fit than another: 'Simply take it like this–Some must be fitter, no? And, if the
fitter survive and reproduce, then the process will look as if there were a selector.'
References:
Williams, R. (1980) 'Ideas of Nature', p.67-85 in Problems in materialism and culture. London:Verso.
Young, R. (1985a) 'Darwinism is social,' in D. Kohn (Ed.), The Darwinian Heritage. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 609-638.
Young, R. (1985b) Darwin's Metaphor: Nature’s place in Victorian culture. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Young, R. (1993) 'Darwin's metaphor and the philosophy of science', Science as Culture 3: 375-403.

Additional question to consider in order to delve deeper into Darwin's writing in the social-historical
context in which it was written:
•

What biases, problems or omissions do you—looking at his work 150 years later—notice in Darwin's
presentation?

•

It's not relevant that Darwin does not talk about genes or DNA, but you might consider what he does
or doesn't say about how inheritance works.

•

Why didn't Darwin use the word evolution in this text?

•

Why is the book named On the Origin of Species?

•

How is Darwin's theory different from Lamarck's?

•

What ideas of nature from Williams’s schema does Darwin employ?

Darwin, C. “Chapter 5, On the development of the intellectual and moral faculties during primeval and
civilised times,” Pp. viii-xxi, 158-184 In The Descent of Man, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1981.
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Evolution matters in thinking about humans and their social arrangements because they can be made to
seem natural, and thus not requiring of social justification or change.
If social Darwinism is construed broadly as attempts to naturalize aspects of society, then Darwin was a
social Darwinist.
The Descent of Man is not just a founding text in the science of sociobiology. Yes, his theoretical
innovations (relative to the Origin)—reciprocal altruism, kin selection, group selection, cultural selection—
foreshadow work going on today. But, these and the central structure of his science (to follow) reflect his
desire to show that features of Victorian society (e.g. imperialism, poverty, meritocracy, Anglo-Saxon
superiority, monogamy) were as they should be.
The structure of his work consists of five strands:
1. Victorian society is as it should be.
2. Natural selection is mechanism of evolution plus adaptation.
3. Panglossianism (from natural theology): everything is adapted.
4. Story telling to fill in gaps.
5. Naturalism: humans in society are subject to natural laws.
•

which come together in showing:
Features of society are produced by natural selection,

•

even though this requires Darwin to

o

invent functions for the features, and

o

invent historical stories in accordance with natural selection (expanded to include the extra innovations)
for the origin of those features.
If you think Darwin might have been able to argue that natural selection explains social behavior without
weaving in all these strands, reread the selections from Descent and note the metaphors he uses, the
"facts" about higher and lower people and characters he chooses to explain, and the features whose
explanation requires him to introduce the extensions to natural selection. We do not have to think Darwin
was impure or just pleasing his audience. Instead, we can interpret the projection of society into science
via the following multiple routes:
Ideas about social order, social "problems," and social change facilitate the scientist's work by
•

getting them interested in a topic and generating questions

•

getting an audience interested in the topic and generating further support and discussion ->
continuing work

•

setting the categories and terms and excluding potential evidence that might not fit

•

setting the questions

•

rendering plausible what otherwise might need evidence to support it and thus avoiding thorny issues

•

providing stimulating metaphors (that can eventually turn out to be restrictive)
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•

allowing them to base parts of their work on data or results (e.g., skull size measurements) that were
are accepted at that time but now are seen as strongly biased

•

getting feedback from dominant social groups (in funding, institutions, publicity, public policy)

Eventually some time later scientists may be able to dissociate some of the scientific ideas from their
original sources of social support. However, that does not undermine the argument that scientific work is
woven out of many social strands and may have developed differently in different social circumstances.
Moreover, some of the weaknesses in Darwin, e.g., ascribing to humans as a species some culturally
specific quality, are worth being on the lookout for in current sociobiology, not to mention everyday
speech and perceptions.

5. Connections and resources
Additional readings
Moore, J. (1986). "Socializing Darwinism: Historiography and the Fortunes of a Phrase," in L. Levidow
(Ed.), Science as Politics. London, Free Association Books, 39-80.
Precis TBA
Taylor, P. J. (1998). "Natural Selection: A heavy hand in biological and social thought." Science as
Culture 7(1): 5-32.
Precis of part of the essay above.
5b. Add to this blog post to make contributions to the revision of the chapter above or to an annotated
collection of readings and other resources related to the chapter.
5c. Adaptation of themes from the chapter to students' own projects of of engaging others in learning or
critical thinking about biology in its social context. Suggestions for how to do that:
i. Identify a key author in your area and examine the premises and logic, analogies, metaphors, and
defensive moves in a key writing of that person.
ii. Others TBA
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Analogy and metaphor (and simile)
Definition, discussion and examples on the internet are confusing. The confusion can be pushed
aside if we focus on the key quality shared by all three terms, namely, inviting readers (or
listeners) to think about A as if it were B.
I would use the term analogy for cases in which the characteristics of B and the way that A and B
correspond are meant to be obvious and thus the readers know what B means they are supposed
to think about A and which aspects of A. If asked, the writer could make everything explicit.
Example: Just as the earth revolves around the sun, an electron revolves around the nucleus.
I would use the term metaphor for cases in which the associations that B has, which the metaphor
carries over to thinking about A, can vary among readers and go beyond what the writer had in
mind. The characteristics of B and which aspects of A and B correspond are not so obvious.
Example: A gang of boys is like a pack of wolves.
Whether an expression serves more as an analogy or a metaphor may depend on the situation,
that is, the writer and audience.
Example: What a general is to an army, a CEO is to a company.
(The three examples come from http://fos.iloveindia.com/analogy-examples.html, a site purporting
to give examples of analogies. See, in the next chapter, more discussion of metaphor and its use
in science and in interpretation of science.)
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Metaphors of Coordination and Development
1. Introduction
•

Until the 1920s, biological inheritance had much broader connotations than transmission of
something discrete (which we now call genes). It also included development. After all, when it is said
that a person resembles their parent, two aspects of the transmission of traits to offspring are being
raised: how does an offspring develop to have the trait in question at all, e.g., its eye color, and how
does the outcome of the development at some point in the lifespan differ from that person to the rest
of the family or population. What, then is the relationship between the study of development and the
study of difference? What is the role of genes in both? Competing answers to these questions are
evident in the contrast between the work of Just and Goldschmidt in the early decades of the
twentieth century.

•

Interpreting the work of Darwin has introduced the role of metaphor in scientific theories and their
presentation to an audience. The account by Gilbert of Just versus Goldschmidt revolves around his
interpretation of the metaphors underlying their work.

1b. Mini-lecture
•

Multiple views of heredity in the early 1900s.

•

Begin the exercise of explaining to aliens how offspring come to resemble their parents.

•

Metaphor; metaphors in science; metaphors in interpretation of science.

2. Reading and other Preparation
•

Review Gilbert, "Animal development," to inform or remind yourself of the processes by which an egg
grows and changes form as an embryo.
o

(Morphogenetic development is not emphasized in biology education. The emphasis is on genes
getting switched on and off.)

•

Complete the exercise of explaining to aliens how offspring come to resemble their parents.
o

•

(This is difficult to do without phrases and metaphors that beg for explanation themselves.)

Read Gilbert, "Cellular politics,” in which Gilbert describes the different views of heredity espoused by
Just and Goldschmidt.
o

Draw up a chart summarizing the different views of heredity espoused by Just and Goldschmidt.
Note, in particular, what controls what and how coordinated action of the different parts of a cell
and organism are achieved.

o

Think about these questions to prepare for class discussion: Gilbert sees a correlation between
the scientists' social position and their actual scientific research. How could social position
influence actual research even if the scientists were consciously trying to build in their social
position? Does Gilbert’s interpretation devalue the science done by these scientists?
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•

Read Lakoff and Johnson, "Concepts We Live By," on metaphors.

•

Take a quick look at software or http://www.math.com/students/wonders/life/life.html on the Game of
Life. If the applets on these sites do not work, google game of life and the name of your browser (e.g.,
chrome) to find a working version.

3. Activities
•

Use the Game of Life to explore analogies with principles of biological development (see below).

•

Invent alternative metaphors of or analogies to embryological development that do not rely on a
central controller but capture the ability of the organism to co-ordinate its own differentiation and
change and thereby make itself.
o

(Build on discussion of inheritance to aliens exercise. Students in the past have described, for
example, improvisional dance, cheese making, and a casual conversation in an elevator. When
compared with the popular metaphors of DNA as code, there is lack of familiar phrases about
development that depict or explain coordination of complex developing parts.)

•

Discuss Gilbert's interpretation of the different views of heredity espoused by Just and Goldschmidt.
o

(See questions under #2.)

Game of Life as "Game of Development"
Warm-up Exercises
1. Begin by setting up a random screen (on software or alternative) and watching it until it stabilizes. If it
doesn’t stabilize after many cycles stop it. Note the different forms you have at the end and their
approximate relative frequencies.
2. Play around with the controls, freezing the game, adding and subtracting pixels, changing the speed
and resolution, until you have a feel for how to run the software.
3. Clear the screen, set up an R- Pentomino and watch it develop. Freeze it after one minute and note the
relative frequency of different forms. Let it go, stop after some more cycles, record, and so on for more
cycles.
4. Start again with an R-Pentomino but perturb it, the first time by adding or subtracting a pixel connected
to the form before it starts; the next time doing the same but after 2 moves; the next time after 4 moves....
until you've seen all you want to see and made observations which match the principles of development
listed below. You will need to begin at slow speed to be able to count the moves and to stop the game
after the right one. You may have to choose a different initial form (other than a R-Pentomino) -- keep it
simple -- to illustrate some of the principles.
Principles of embryological development
For each principle below make notes to yourself of the circumstances in the "Game of Development"
which you observed that match. Imagine also that changes in the initial conditions correspond to
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mutations or recombinations and any changes after a run starts correspond to some environmental
change, e.g., contact with a teratogen.
1. Local rules, here interactions between neighboring pixels, can lead to integrated, stable morphologies
on a large scale.
2. Local rules can lead to order arising out of initial disorder.
3. Mutations or recombinations can sometimes have no effect, sometimes lead to obliteration of
morphogenesis, and sometimes lead to novel, stable morphologies.
4. Changes in the environment can sometimes have no effect, sometimes lead to obliteration of
morphogenesis, and sometime lead to novel, stable morphologies.
5. The effect of mutations/ recombinations can be quite unpredictable.
6. Perturbations early in development usually have a more severe effect than perturbations later in
development. Find an exception in the game.
7. Interactions between cells can produce patterns of cells on a larger scale than the original cells that
were interacting.
8. Simple starting shape leads to a range of final shapes (= differentiation during development).
9. Some shapes are way-stations that are obliterated by later developments.

4. Synthesis and extensions
A. Sapp
Precis TBA
B. The “Game of Development” variant of the Game of Life (involving cellular automata) asks students to
find analogs to observations in embryology and developmental biology that render plausible an alternative
picture to genes controlling development:
•

The organism is a composite of coherent processes.
o

Changes, e.g. produced by mutations, can yield significant (or trivial) but still integrated change in
the organism.
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•

•

Development is a complex process of structures arising out of structure, and so
o

a change in genes does not necessarily imply a change in some characters.

o

a change in genes can sometimes result in a discrete change in some characters.

Although development is complex, this doesn't imply the need for a controlling center. Local rules of
interaction can yield larger scale co-ordination.
o

Development of social characters will be similarly complex and difficult to tie down to genes, but
even more so because

§

a) post-embryonic development involves more extensive interaction with the environment and

§

b) social characters involve interaction among individuals.

C. Notes on ways that metaphors can be analyzed in scientific
writing: http://www.faculty.umb.edu/peter_taylor/metaphor.html
•

“[W]hen we search for new concepts and metaphors, or more generally, use words and text to make
arguments and seek to convince others, we privilege three related and persistent ‘meta-metaphors’:
‘1) metaphors are root, fundamental, underlying things that shape the surface layers; 2) mental
things—thoughts, expectations, what we see—shape our actions; and 3) culture or society get into
these thoughts (and so we can be taught [or argued into] how to conceive/perceive the world’...
These meta-metaphors discount our experience of thought being constructed in practical activity from
diverse resources.” (Taylor 2001)

5. Connections and resources
Gilbert, S. F. and A. Fausto-Sterling (2003). "Educating for social responsibility: changing the syllabus of
developmental biology." Int J Dev Biol 47(2-3): 237-44.
•

Two different approaches to reworking a developmental biology course so as to address biology-insociety.

Oyama, S. (2001). Terms in tension: What do you do when all the good words are taken? Cycles of
Contingency: Developmental Systems and Evolution. S. Oyama, P. Griffith and R. Gray. Cambridge, MA,
MIT Press: 177-193.
•

TBA

Taylor, P. J. (2001). Distributed agency within intersecting ecological, social, and scientific processes.
Cycles of Contingency: Developmental Systems and Evolution. S. Oyama, P. Griffiths and R. Gray.
Cambridge, MA, MIT Press: 313-332.
•

"In a ‘section of Susan Oyama’s The Ontogeny of Information on ‘Subjects and Objects.’ Oyama
describes our primary experience of ourselves as subjects maturing from dependence and passivity
to independence and control—what I call ‘concentrated’ agency. We come to experience temporal
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continuity, casual potency, and are able to impart order according to prior knowledge and plan. This
experience, however, ‘exaggerates our role as detached subjects and denies our object-like status’
(Oyama 1985, 76). Accordingly, when we try to explain development, interaction, and perception, we
tend to posit another subject inside ourselves—mental modules, optimizing or rational actors, or,
most notably, genes. Similarly, to explain the order of the world people have traditionally posited a
subject outside it, God, or, more recently, ‘the-forces-of-natural-selection.’
•

In order to develop better explanations of development, interaction, and perception, we need, Oyama
implies, metaphors and concepts that do not rely on the dynamic unity and coherency of agents, or
on superintending agents within or outside those agents. And, to the extent that such patterns of
thought persist because of their resonance with the experience agents have of their relations and
actions in the material and social world, we need different experience. Or, better, we need to highlight
submerged experience of ourselves as ‘object-like’ or ‘distributed,’ that is, as agents dependent on
other people and many, diverse resources beyond the boundaries of our physical or mental selves.
After all, the primary experience of becoming an autonomous subject is not ‘raw’ experience, let alone
uniform and universal experience..., but experience mediated through particular social discourse.

•

There are circles here to be wrestled with. New concepts and metaphors might emerge if we
experienced ourselves differently, but what counts as our primary experience is mediated by
prevailing conceptual schemes and shared metaphors. And in current Western social discourse,
these highlight our autonomy as subjects. Conversely, when some of us seek to theorize
Developmental Systems or, in my case, to highlight distributed agency, we foresake the facilitation
afforded by prevailing concepts and metaphors of concentrated agency. To so distance ourselves
from the dominant discourse, however, requires a strong sense of ‘independence’ and ‘causal
potency’ in attempting to impose an order—on one’s world and on one’s audiences.”

5b. Add to this blog post to make contributions to the revision of the chapter above or to an annotated
collection of readings and other resources related to the chapter.
5c. Adaptation of themes from the chapter to students' own projects of of engaging others in learning or
critical thinking about biology in its social context: Suggestions for how to do that:
i. Identify an idea that is central to your project area, e.g., balance of life, and invent an activity that
leads your audience to explore the complexities of associations that the term might have once one
starts probing it.
ii. Identify a theory that is central to your project area, e.g., genetic coding, and invent an activity that
leads your audience to explore its history, noting especially the contrasting theories that have been
held.
iii. Adapt an existing game so it illustrates ideas related to your project area that are difficult to
visualize or to experience.
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Inheritance for aliens

Imagine that humans have established communication with beings from another planet that
neither age nor reproduce. Your task is to draw diagrams or schemas that convey to them
how your parents contributed to you having the height or intelligence you have at 20 or so
years. (The aliens have learnt English so you can use words on your diagrams.) The
explanation conveyed in your diagrams or schemas might include genes, DNA, gene
expression, embryology, environmental influences on your growth and development, and so
on. Try to help the aliens by identifying what is left unexplained.
These beings are very intelligent themselves and are also scientific skeptics. If there is a hole
in your explanation they will find it. You might want to preempt them by marking where you
feel you need to find out more about how human inheritance works. You should also note that
these aliens have received some information previously that emphasized meiosis and
formation of the single-cell zygote. In return, they commented that zygotes have no height or
intelligence and re-emphasized that they want to know how offspring get to have a height or
intelligence similar (or not) to their parents.
The aim of this exercise is for you to think through something often avoided in biology,
namely, the limitations of what most biologists actually know and don't know about inheritance.
After you have tried this for yourself, review some phrases students used in a past class.
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Metaphor Notes, Peter Taylor
Contents
1. Notes on readings, made with a view to stimulating discussion and clarification
2. From mental and verbal images to "acting as if" as meta-metaphor , excerpt from
"Shifting positions for knowing and intervening in the cultural politics of the life sciences,"
draft afterword for Changing Life: Genomes-Ecologies-Bodies-Commodities (U. Minnesota
Press, 1997)
3. Notes for teaching, as revised in Fall '95

1. Notes on readings, made with a view to stimulating discussion and clarification
February 1996
The selection of readings is a small sample of the published literature, but enough to highlight
the two meta-metaphors I see in Stepan and begin to articulate what's missing, what needs to
be worked on, what I'd like to discuss with others. [Material in brackets is my interpretation
and commentary]
After my reading notes I attach i) a brief sketch of where I am trying to push things; and ii) an
overview I composed to help me sort out what to say to my undergraduate class when I
discussed natural selection as a metaphor.
-------------------Stepan, N. L. (1986). "Race and gender: The role of analogy in science." Isis 77: 261-277.
[Her meta-metaphors are
1a) metaphors are root, fundamental, underlying things that shape the surface layers; which is
related to
1b) mental things -- thoughts, expectations, what we see -- shape our actions; and
2) culture or society gets into these thoughts etc. -- we can be taught (see Gilman quote) how
to conceive/ perceive the world.
These are not winning meta-metaphors for me, given my idea that all action and thought is
constructed in practical activity from heterogeneous resources.]
-------------------Danzinger, K. (1990). "Generative metaphor and the history of psychological discourse," in D.
E. Leary (Ed.), Metaphors in the History of Psychology. Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 331-356.
Metaphor = phenomenon of thought as well as speech.
Repeated metaphors reveal patterns of thought.
Patterns allow us to analyze underlying assumptions and preoccupations.
[Note here the slippage from pattern to locus of causality in line with Stepan's meta-metaphor
1. In fact, later on...]
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Metaphors tend to be hidden and not expressed in a single term, but "underlie the discourse as
a whole." Also: "basic metaphor" "underlying cognitive schema" (p. 338)
Openness allows both coherence (communication within a common framework) and
difference in emphasis, including difference evolving over time, i.e., novelty.
Novelty is to be expected given
i) metaphors are extended, i.e., terms are part of reticulating networks of implications; and
ii) Black's interaction theory of metaphor (both terms influence the meaning taken by the
other)
Together i) and ii) mean metaphors bring "together systems of implications [entailing] the
likely formation of new connections" (p. 334)
[Notice that the interest in novelty does not extend to asking which novel metaphors are taken
up and become part of discourse.]
Novelty and on-going evolution of systems of implications of a metaphor means that we
cannot be sure a term at time t and at time t+T refer to the same thing. We need to locate the
terms in the discursive systems of their times.
[Note the dichotomy: meaning by reference or meaning within context of discursive system.]
The discursive system involves the functioning of any analogized artifact in a particular social
organization. Following Schön (see below), metaphors invite us "to act in terms of certain
implied assumptions" (p. 351).
[I like this emphasis on acting as if. One's ability to act as if could explain which metaphors
are taken up and which are forgotten (see above). But Danzinger closes off this line of inquiry
before it has a chance to get anywhere...]
Activity takes place within forms of life, "'practical actualities'... 'whose significance goes
without saying'" (citing Toulmin)
[This the agent may act as if, but this is generated not the effectiveness of one's acting as if,
but by who the agent is. Forms of life imply some socialization process, so we have here
another case of Stepan's meta-metaphor 2.]
-------------------Lakoff, G. (1993). "The contemporary theory of metaphor," in A. Ortony (Ed.), Metaphor and
Thought. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 202-251.
[like Danzinger] locus of metaphor not in language, but in thought, in "cross-domain
mapping[s] in the conceptual system' (p. 203).
"everyday behavior reflects our metaphorical understanding of experience" (p. 204)
"Is there a general principle governing (the mappings)?" (p. 206)
[Note empirical regularities and commonalities are taken without questioning to be governing
or generative. See similar note on Danzinger.]
Answer: Yes, it's "part of the conceptual system underlying English" (p. 206).
[Stepan m-m 1 again]
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-------------------Reddy, M. (1993). "The conduit metaphor: A case of frame conflict in our language about
language," in A. Ortony (Ed.), Metaphor and Thought. Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 164-201.
Reddy, a linguist, chronicles many, many variants in the English language of the conduit
metaphor for communication of ideas between people. Against this he proposes a "toolmaker's
paradigm," which highlights and valorizes the efforts of the listener in shaping the outcome of
communication. "Partial miscommunication, or divergence of readings from a single text, are
not aberrations. They are tendencies inherent in the system [of communication], which can
only be counteracted by continuous effort and by large amounts of verbal interaction" (p. 175).
Because "language influences thought processes" (p. 173), the conduit metaphor in English
suppresses the effort or awareness of the effort.
[Actually, language governs thought processes for Reddy (like Lakoff). The toolmaking image
is not an invitation to examine the relationship of material practices to thought. Reddy doesn't
explore these implications of his metaphor. "Effort" is equated to verbal interaction.]
-------------------Gergen, K. J. (1990). "Metaphor, metatheory, and the social world," in D. E. Leary
(Ed.), Metaphors in the History of Psychology. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 267299.
"metaphors... advance understanding of social life" "...generate... theoretical developments" (p.
267) "pervad[e] social psychological theories" (p. 294) [i.e., Stepan's m-m 1]
As a metaphor "gradually becomes incorporated into the communal practices and as the new
patterns become solidified, the term will become increasingly literal." (p. 270) [Gergen is a
social constructivist in the Berger & Luckmann sense...] A new metaphor is only partly
intelligible and acceptable, but becomes more so an an "outcome of ongoing interchange
among persons" (p. 271). "[M]eaning is derived from an array of patterned practices within
varying contexts" (p. 270) -- which he see as an extension of Wittgenstein's language games as
context in which terms have meaning.
[Note that he hasn't addressed what influences whether a metaphor will be taken up and
become part of the "ongoing interchange" and "communal practices." The extended
Wittgensteinian formulation means that culture/ society/ forms of life/ patterned practices
precede thoughts, i.e., Stepan's m-m 2.]
-------------------Schön, D. (1993). "Generative metaphor: A perspective on problem-setting in social policy,"
in A. Ortony (Ed.), Metaphor and Thought. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 137-163.
[Danzinger cites Schön's essay when he says metaphors invite us "to act in terms of certain
implied assumptions." But I read Schön as following the model of thought generates action,
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but where the thoughts/ metaphors he concerns himself with are the subset related to dominant
social policies.]
Metaphor is central to framing and generating new perspectives, to "seeing as." Generative
metaphors underlie stories and through stories problems (e.g., in social policy) are framed or
set. Frame restructuring requires new metaphors and stories. [Stepan's meta-metaphor 1 again.]
Two puzzles:
i) Interpreting thinking from what is said and done [i.e., what is said and done follows from
what is thought]. Deep metaphors need to be exposed in order to understand surface ones, to
see what is assumed, excluded, included, and to understand why policy framings can be
incommensurable. Critical interpretive work can help lead to frame-restructuring [but see the
end of my note on ii) below].;
ii) What is involved in generativity.
"A situation may begin by seeming complex, uncertain, and indeterminate. If one can once see
it, however, in terms of a normative dualism such as health/disease or nature/artifice, then we
shall know in what direction to move" (p. 148). Achieving this is the hallmark of a generative
metaphor.
[Note the collapsing going on here. While generativity could be defined in terms of qualities of
the metaphor, Schön evaluates generativity in terms of the outcome, i.e., people knowing what
direction to move. He slips in the proposition that discursive reduction of complexity is needed
for people to get their direction clear (which overlooks questions about how people are
rhetorically enrolled through discursive reductions and about whether simple models
contribute to the problem of constrained policy-setting). Furthermore, Schön's generative
metaphors are actually a subset of those that reduce complexity and point to a direction to
follow, namely those that underlie the dominant policy framings.
Given this collapsing, it's not surprising that by the end Schön has only got to the point of
posing the question of what facilitates frame-restructuring work -- there's little in the essay that
would help us address it. And given his adherence to the framework that action follows
thought, it's not surprising that he envisages this as "cognitive work" (p. 160).]
-------------------Yanagisako, S. and C. Delaney (1995). "Naturalizing power," in S. Yanagisako and C.
Delaney (Eds.), Naturalizing Power: Essays in Feminist Cultural Analysis. New York,
Routledge, 1-22.
[This essay is not directly about metaphor, but it employs Stepan's meta-metaphors.]
"differentials of power come already embedded in culture. That is what we mean by
naturalizing power, for power appears natural, inevitable, even god-given" (p. 1)
[Too much ground is conceded here; the propositions need more precision. Consider:
i) How does culture operate so that people have the idea that only if something is not
culturally- or socially-generated (i.e., is natural or god-given) it is inevitable?
ii) What is the model implied in the "embedded" metaphor? Answer: A person cannot refer to
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something not permitted in the existing system of inter-references, which, e.g., exclude power
as something socially generated. Is this a plausible model of thought and verbal expression?
Although in the essay Y&G acknowledge that things are both real and discursive, their anchor
is that culture, a system of rules and meanings, determines what meanings can be readily
established, or, teasing this open a bit: culture -> an agent's subjectivity -> their thought ->
action (Stepan's m-m 2). The metaphor of embedded, underlying, etc. then make senses as well
(Stepan's m-m 1).
It seems to me that in Y&G culture-given as inevitable is the analog of god-given and natural
as inevitable. Given that Y&G's book is feminist cultural analysis, inevitability might seem to
work against their purpose. But, maybe not, because it simplifies their self-positioning. (This
point needs discussion.)
Excerpt from "Shifting positions for knowing and intervening in the cultural politics of the life
sciences," draft afterword for Changing Life: Genomes-Ecologies-Bodies-Commodities (U.
Minnesota Press, 1997).
From mental and verbal images to "acting as if" as meta-metaphor
Agents, whether working as scientists or cultural interpreters, draw upon a sense of what the
material and social world is like. Interpreters observing this "likening" try to convey what it is
like. Sampling from Haraway's work, agents are involved in: noninnocent conversations using
visualization technologies; holding partial perspectives; situated knowing; story-telling;
embodied vision; worldly diffraction; viewing the doings; materialized refiguration. Notice
that all but the last term connotes the making of mental and verbal images; images that we
believe or think the world is like, or that we speak or write as if it were like. In general,
likening is taken to mean having an image that corresponds to the world. But there is another
sense of likening that parallels the first shift in our basis for knowing and intervening: we
also act as if. In fact, while viewing, speaking, and thinking are indeed actions, they are
particular kinds; "acting as if" could be viewed as a more inclusive "meta-metaphor" of
likening.
In this light, we would seek to learn what is at stake in any representational or discursive work.
What is it that the agents are trying with their ideas to do something about? Moreover, what
needs to be done practically in order to modify their moves? Following this line of
questioning, the activity of scientific and interpretive agents can be interpreted as richly
metaphorical in the more inclusive, "acting as if," sense. To choose one example... Yes, global
computer modelers think that human activity forms a system to be managed, but more
importantly, their categories, tools and social positioning jointly enable them to act -- in
actuality or in powerful fantasies -- as if they were the planet's managers. Or, if not the
managers, their close advisers.
Notes for teaching, as revised in Fall '95 (i.e., before I completed the readings above)
In literature
A poet uses "inferno" to describe a fire, evoking in the reader associations such as inferno =
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hell, death, worse thing possible, out of the benevolent God's control, etc. A fire is
not literally the inferno, but because the reader has strong associations with infernos, this stirs
up their thinking to think of it as if it were the inferno. Gradually this metaphor has faded -in part, I suspect because hell no longer evokes such strong associations -- and inferno is now
used to describe any severe fire (it has become a cliche), and the metaphor may eventually
die*, e.g., "raging fire" means a fire that is unchecked and hardly evokes a person (or god) in
rage. The process is never, however, even; metaphorical associations are always open, that is,
they are
-not specified by the writer/speaker;
-differ from reader to reader; and
-differ for any reader according to circumstance.
In language
Meaning by reference is contrasted to meaning by associations
dictionary thesaurus
atomized* web-like, network
specifiable open
In philosophy
There have been many big (protracted, convoluted, jargon-full) debates about meaning and
reference, which led to/ carried over into analysis of metaphor. One useful idea, which I
associate with Max Black, is reciprocal animation. If we use the metaphor inferno to
animate* our thinking about fires, then we also animate our thinking about hell by thinking of
it as if it were like being inside, burnt by, as hot as, as noisy as... a severe fire. We can refine
Black's insight if we note that there is usually some lag; the secondary animation (fire as a
metaphor for hell) develops over time.
Development of metaphors over time (PT):
Step 1: (Carrying over/ As if/ Animation) Metaphor B (= Name B + Associations of B)
animates thinking about phenomenon A. The "carrying over" changes associations of A ->
associations' of A. The animation relies for its impact on A being not literally B, and on B
being part of a network of associations (which includes other metaphors).
Step 2A (Dead metaphor): Name B is still used to describe A but no longer evokes the
associations of B, or, at least, not so strongly.
or
Step 2B (Reciprocal animation): Some of the original associations of A are carried over to B
so that associations of B -> associations' of B. With time the effect may be less one of stirring
up and more one of infusion.
Step 3B (Collapsed metaphor): Reciprocal infusion continues; the difference in associations' of
A and associations' of B diminishes; and the Name B may carried over to A, resulting in a new
composite, AB. The non-literalness of A's likeness to B is now elusive, and pointing it out is
apt to be confusing unless the original context of use is evoked well.
Step 3A/4B (Displaced metaphor): Dead and collapsed metaphors can gain associations from
elsewhere; e.g., "toe the line" died and became reborn* as "tow the line."

58

For example, when Darwin used Natural selection to describe a mechanism of evolutionary
change capable of producing adaptations, he was playing on connotations both of selection by
humans of plant and animal varieties and of Nature being like a superintending God (so that it
could intentionally rank and select). The metaphor was striking because he was saying that
there was not literally a selector in nature using some selection criterion, but the result could
appear as though there were. Nowadays when selection is intentionally performed in society,
e.g., by educational testers, the ranking* seems to be follow a principle given by nature, not
merely a social convention (reciprocal animation). Moreover, biologists now talk about the
environment being an agent of selection or a selective force, that is, agency, selection, and
application of force do not have to be intentional, and the term for evolutionary generation of
adaptations is now natural selection (collapsed metaphor). Biologists often use the term natural
selection even when they have not identified a character that conferred the survival and
reproductive advantage, that is, have neither an intentional agent nor a "selection criterion,"
and so, to some extent, it is also a dead metaphor. And Elliott Sober, a philospher of biology,
has developed a complete analysis based on thinking of natural selection as a force (displaced
metaphor).
The questions left open by this description of development over time are:
i) what influences whether a metaphor gains currency*?; and
ii) what motors* the changes?
The difficulty in answering these questions is related to the complexity of reticulating*
networks of associated metaphors (see steps 1 and 3A/4B).
In science studies analyses
a) Dominant metaphors of one's time organize one's thinking in general, and in science in
particular, so that a scientist's theories and texts are structured* (in part?) by the metaphor,
e.g., progress, development.
b) Metaphors are rhetorical resources used to move* different audiences (recall the openness
of metaphors) to entertain new ideas.
c) Metaphors crystallize* (but not fully) something that had been difficult to see*, but that
people were ready to speak about if given a suitable image, e.g., natural selection, "look back
in anger."
d) (PT) Metaphors are powerful to the extent that they contribute to the social circumstances
allowing the user/receiver not just to think as if A were like B, but to act as if A were like B.
Eventually, this acting as if may collapse the metaphor (see above).
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Explanatory phrases from the inheritance-to-aliens assignment
(underlined phrases are metaphors themselves)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Individuals are born with characteristics from their parents
Paired chromosomes made up of genes determine all of the offspring's characteristics
From infancy a gradual metamorphosis occurs
Combinations of genes determine height; the environment plays a large role
Humans do not inherit characteristics; they inherit genes = possibilities
Humans are ultimately made up of genes
Genes control the biological and developmental aspects of human life
genetic material propagates itself
differentiation is controlled by chemical coding
genes are ultimately responsible for most characteristics
height is a genetic trait, inherited from one's parents; environment may have some influence
genes are composed of information, the basic formula for cells
genes compose the internal environment of humans
the genetic formula contains a program of the developmental process
Biological factors inherited from parents combine with developmental and external factors
DNA codes for specific proteins
genes are the units of inheritance at the cellular basis
genes are the fundamental basis of development
maximum potentials lie within the chromosomes
external insults limit the full expression of intelligence
genetics determine the capacity
capacities have been passed on to me
genetic material contributes information which determines the offspring's makeup
genes are responsible for the initiation and direction of development
genes code for proteins which stimulate development
the environment merely delimits how genes will be expressed
the nucleus is the control center of the cell
genes = information determine characteristics
DNA = inheritance link
genes = raw material inherited
the zygote undergoes billions of cell divisions to become a baby
intelligence may be strictly due to genetic processes; the environment may act by
turning genes on and off
genes determine some specific characteristic
cells arrange themsleves in a pattern
sperm/ egg contain all the information necessary to build another male/female
genes carry the information
genetically transferred
inherit genetic potential; expression depends on environmental factors
genes code for traits
an individual is a product of a set of instructions of a program
dissect the complex relationship between nature and nurture
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What causes a disease? The consequences of hereditarianism in the
case of pellagra
1. Introduction
•

•

The causes proposed reflect the social actions desired or supported given that
o

the categories used (and thus data collected)

o

assumptions needed to make causal claims from patterns
§

are places where social assumptions can influence the scientist's decision, and

§

science cannot be done without decisions in these areas

When people make explanations, you may look at how they attempted to identify or locate the
causation and consider alternative styles of causal explanation. If a scientist is emphasizing, say, a
unitary cause, consider the multiple factors they are excluding.

•

This approach will help you raise questions about the other commitments that influence their choice
of questions, categories, factors, and admissable explanations. The causal explanation that is
advanced often corresponds to the person's commitments to certain forms of social action, e.g.
Galton (Darwin's cousin) didn't measure any environmental variables and was thus able only to reach
conclusions about (supposedly) inborn characters; Davenport and others similarly denied the
significance of Goldberger's experimental evidence for dietary basis of pellagra.

•

Identification of more proximate causes (e.g., a lung cancer gene) is not necessarily needed to
ensure the most effective action (e.g., we can encourage people to stop smoking independently of
knowing the genetic mechanisms of lung cancer).

1b. Mini-lecture
Review of beriberi case and introduction to pellagra, focusing on
Styles of causal explanation and their relation to ideas about politics and social action (themes and
schema)

2. Reading
Chase, A. (1977). "False Correlations = Real Deaths," in The Legacy of Malthus. NY: Knopf, 201-225.
(precis below; full chapter in password-protected readings.
•

Identify the different notions about the cause of pellagra and any assumptions you can see underlying
those notions.

•

Identify or speculate about the actions favored with respect to pellagra by the different people or
groups of people Chase describes.

•

Take notes to enable you to assume either Goldberger's or Davenport’s scientific and social position
and convince people to take some action on the basis of what he believed about pellagra and about
society.
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•

Make notes on questions you would investigate to help you make your case if you were asked to
support or dispute this proposition: "Goldberger's discovery could not prevent pellagra in the 1910s
and 20s in the United States, but could in the 1930s."

Chase, Allen. (1976). “A Few False Correlations = A Few Million Real Deaths: Scientific Racism Prevails
Over Scientific Truth.” The Legacy of Malthus. The social costs of the new scientific racism. New York,
Knopf.
Misdiagnosed for centuries as leprosy, scurvy, syphilis, and other diseases marked by rough red skin
eruptions, pellagra was described by the Spanish physician Gaspar Casal in 1735 as a distinct disease
that he called mal de la rosa (the red disease). It was, in each country, a disease of the very poor, in
which the skin eruptions were followed by debilitating sequences of diarrhea, lassitude, dizziness, and
various mental disorders ranging from depression to violent lunacy.
In 1906, George H. Searcy, a southern physician, discovered many cases of pellagra among the inmates
of the Mount Vernon insane asylum in Alabama. Doctors and public health officials started to seek out
non-institutionalized cases of the red disease and soon realized that pellagra was endemic throughout
the poorest section of the nation, the southern states. By 1908, various states had established pellagra
commissions, and a new National Association for the Study of Pellaga held the first of its annual scientific
meetings devoted to reports and discussions on the causes and management of the new plague.
A major treatise by Dr. Edward Jenner Wood in 1912 revealed that “the cause of pellagra is still
unknown…” although there abounded a number of hypotheses at that time. Throughout medical
literature, however, there was one constant thread of evidence suggesting that pellagra was caused by
the inadequate diets of poverty and that in the presence of enough food, the disease never struck.
Although he reviewed many of the early European authors who had written about pellagra and diet, Dr.
Wood remained resistant and wrote that, “I can deny that bad nourishment in the sense of insufficient
nourishment is a cause.”
In 1912, a Pellagra Commission was established under the auspices of the New York Post-Graduate
Medical School and Hospital, initially under the direction of Joseph F. Siler, a physician with the Army
Medical Corps, and Philip E. Garrison, a Navy surgeon. The following year, Dr. Charles B. Davenport (a
zoologist by training) from the Eugenics Records Office in Cold Springs Harbor, New York, joined forces
with the Commission with the intention to study pellagra from the viewpoint of heredity as a causative
factor. Around the same time, due to the continuing social and economic problems caused by pellagra
(disease-caused absenteeism in the textile mills; the loss of European markets for American corn due to
the mistaken belief that corn was responsible for the disease), the Surgeon General of the United States
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appointed bacteriologist Joseph Goldberger of the U.S. Public Health Service to discover the cause and
cure for pellagra. Coming from an impoverished immigrant family background himself, Goldberger had a
greater insight into the total environment of poverty than did Siler or Garrison. He, too, set up his
fieldwork in Spartanburg, South Carolina, where Siler and Garrison were working, but he took the time to
travel around the district, visiting the insane asylums, the orphan asylums, mill towns and rural slums
where pellagra was rampant. He noticed two things: that whenever there was great poverty, there was
pellagra, and that the better off employees of the prisons, asylums, or mills never developed a single
case of pellagra. Although the disease had been known about for far longer than other diseases, pellagra
was possibly never considered within the ranks of the great plagues such as malaria, yellow fever, or
typhoid because it struck only the poorest.
Goldberger set out to prove his hypothesis that pellagra was not a communicable disease, but was
instead caused by the lack of an unknown vitamin which he called the PP (Pellagra Preventative) factor –
as well as meats, poultry, fish, dairy products, fruits and vegetables in the diet. He conducted a number
of famous experiments in Mississippi with volunteer white prison inmates in whom he first induced
pellagra by withholding and then cured them by re-introducing meats, vegetable, and eggs into their diet.
In another dramatic experiment, Goldberger, his wife Mary and his assistant Dr. G.A. Wheeler injected
themselves with biological materials from pellagrins consisting of blood, vials of skin scrapings and
ingested little dough balls impregnated with the urine and feces of the patients.
The publication of Goldberger’s report on his Mississippi experiments came as something of a blow to
the Pellagra Commission in which Siler, Garrison, and Dr. Ward T. MacNeal were working. At the same
meeting where Goldberger and his colleagues reported their findings, MacNeal offered his report, which
identified lack of plumbing and sewerage as the culprit in pellagra. Goldberger pointed out that the
relationship of pellagra to sewerage might be a case of “false correlation” since the well-to-do [and better
fed] had the sewers in the town and the poorest [undernourished] citizens lacked plumbing and
sewerage. His argument was dismissed by MacNeal who proposed that the analysis of mass data by
statistical correlations – a method adopted by Davenport – was preferable to just “theorizing” about the
data.
Despite the convincing case made by Goldberger for a diet-related cause to pellagra, the mortality
figures for the disease continued to rise in the years following his discovery. Among the several reasons
for this disappointing result, one stands out: the efforts by Charles B. Davenport to correlate the
incidence of mental deficiency and insanity associated with pellagra to his view that pellagra was an
inheritable disease. Davenport’s thesis was that pellagra was “the reaction of the individual to the
poisons elaborated in the body, probably by a parasitic organism.” To reach this conclusion, he also had
to explain that although pellagra was not an inheritable disease in the sense that brown eye color was
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inheritable, the course of the disease did indeed depend on certain “constitutional, inheritable” traits of
the affected individual. “Susceptible” parents would produce children who were also susceptible to the
disease.
Davenport and Elizabeth Muncey, M.D., published an article on the hereditary causes of pellagra in the
Archives of Internal Medicine. Subsequently reprinted as a Bulletin of the Eugenics Record Office, it
made a third and final appearance in the final report of the pellagra Commission. In this report,
Davenport and Muncey presented their detailed tables and pedigree trees (the ‘black charts’ of eugenics)
that purported to establish their view that pellagra was a hereditary disease. These pedigree charts only
succeeded in proving that the children and grandchildren of poor people [would] quite predictably suffer
the socially preventable deficiency diseases of poverty. The size (444 pages), scientific complexity, and
‘authoritative’ tone of the Davenport report combined with the low standard of medical education that
produced physicians who did not have the capacity to question the report’s veracity, meant that most
accepted the conclusion that it was “bad genes” and not “bad diet” that was responsible for pellagra.
Society, specifically the public health policies in society, was thus let off the hook in terms of acting to
increase the living standards generally among the working poor. The excuse for doing nothing to improve
the economic opportunities of the poor in the South which, in turn, would have allowed people to earn
enough money to adequately feed themselves and their families – was justified by the ‘inborn inferiority’
of the poor. Ironically, it was not until the Great Depression when the government started disbursing food
and welfare funds to save the lives of all people rendered hungry and helpless, that Goldberger’s
pellagra prevention factor was able to protect all classes of people.
The Great Pellagra Cover-Up fro 1916-1933 was the result of “scientific racism.” Had Goldberger’s
findings been acted upon, millions of completely avoidable premature deaths, chronic degenerative
diseases and other disorders known to be associated with chronic undernourishment could have been
avoided. Such was the missed opportunity that benevolent social action should have had on the clinical
reactions to malnutrition.
(Precis by Jan Coe)

3. Activity
•

Use themes and schema to review the different notions about the cause of pellagra, assumptions
underlying those notions, and the actions favored with respect to pellagra by the different people or
groups of people Chase describes.

•

Take the role of Goldberger or Davenport to convince others to act on your scientific account.
(Students randomly assigned to one role or the other.)
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•

(Time permitting) Discussion of questions you would investigate to help you make your case if you
were asked to support or dispute this proposition: "Goldberger's discovery could not prevent pellagra
in the 1910s and 20s in the United States, but could in the 1930s."

4. Synthesis and extensions
TBA

5. Connections and resources
Harkness, J. M. (1996). "Prisoners and Pellagra." Public Health Reports 111(September/October): 63–
467.
•

Goldberger is the hero in Chase's chapter. Harkness makes us think about a dimension of
Goldberger's work not highlighted by Chase. How does it affect you to see that dimension if it had not
concerned you before reading Harkness?

Marks, H. M. (2003). "Epidemiologists Explain Pellagra: Gender, Race, and Political Economy in the Work
of Edgar Sydenstricker." Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 58(1): 34-55.
•

Marks adds additional dimensions to our understanding of research that Goldberger began and was
continued by his collaborator Sydenstricker through the 1920s.

•

Goldberger, a US Public Health Service doctor who showed the connection between diet and pellagra
through observation and experiments with a prison population, also worked with Sydenstricker in the
mid-1910s to show the association in data derived from 7 mill towns in S. Carolina. The association
was clear against income per adult male equivalent (with nutritional needs of wives and children set
lower). They did not go beyond this statistic to examine distribution within households and shed no
light the higher incidence of pellagra among women. In subsequent work on sharecroppers and
tenant farmers in Mississippi, Sydenstricker examined the annual and debt-related restriction on food
supply but made no distinction between whites and blacks and shed no light on the disproportionate
incidence of pellagra among blacks. Marks concludes that, by distracting attention from gender and
racial inequalities, "research methods and traditions, no less than overt ideologies, played a role in
maintaining the subordinate social position of women and African-Americans in the southern United
States" (p.34). There is more to Marks' account, including the more pluralistic idea of race in the
areas of high immigration in the industrial Northern USA and access to fresh foods in some villages
but not the strict mill towns.

5b. Add to this blog post to make contributions to the revision of the chapter above or to an annotated
collection of readings and other resources related to the chapter.
5c. Adaptation of themes from the chapter to students' own projects of engaging others in learning or
critical thinking about biology in its social context: Suggestions for how to do that—
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i. Have your audience identify the different kinds of causes and the kinds of actions that would influence
those causes (as THINK14 did). Then consider the social position or views of the exponents of different
kinds of causes in relation to the different kinds of causes and the kinds of actions that would influence
those causes.
ii. Brainstorm with instructor
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Styles of causal explanation and their relation to ideas about action
Theme 1:
The causes proposed reflect social actions desired/ supported
because
the categories used (and thus data collected)
assumptions needed to make causal claims from patterns
are places where social assumptions can influence the scientist's decision, and
science cannot be done without decisions in these areas
Theme 2 :
When people make explanations look at how they attempted to identify or locate the causation
and consider alternatives/ tensions. If a scientist is emphasizing, say, a unitary cause, consider
the multiple factors they are excluding.
This approach will help you raise questions about the other commitments that influence their
choice of questions, categories, factors, and admissable explanations. The causal explanation
that is advanced often corresponds to the person's commitments to certain forms of social action,
e.g. Galton (Darwin's cousin) didn't measure any environmental variables and was thus able only
to reach conclusions about (supposedly) inborn characters; Davenport and others similarly denied
the significance of Goldberger's experimental evidence for dietary basis of pellagra. Can you
identify similar divergences in explanations of causes and proposals for action in the case of other
diseases, e.g. cancer, AIDS?

Some tensions:
local/focal , proximate, single factors <--- synthetic, multiple factors
->
+ certain background factors
/

|

\

/

assumed controlled
|
|

specified &
modifiable

nongenerally
separable interacting

linked in specific
ways

|

|

|

|

|

holistic

interactive,
synergistic

“constructionist”

|

“unitary” engineering, “background”
experimental

|

\

-- internal to some object (e.g. each individual person) vs. in the external relations
-- in the present situation vs. in its history
causes exposed by:
some data

+ some assumptions

|

\

/

naturally variable
observations

experimentally controlled ones

bias plausible bits of
evidence

|

\

“false” correlations

good comparative
work

|

\
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Theme 3:
More proximate causes (e.g., a lung cancer gene) are not necessarily needed to ensure the most
effective action (we can encourage people to stop smoking independently of knowing the genetic
mechanisms of lung cancer).
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How changeable are IQ test scores?
1. Introduction
A continuation of the critical thinking theme of interpreting scientific ideas in relation to the actions favored
by the exponents of those ideas is to pose a question that can be asked of all sides: What can we do (on
the basis of the science)?
1b. Mini-lecture (interactive)
•

Interpreting parent-offspring height patterns

•

Interpreting differences in averages for groups
* The world is not a simple matter of genes explaining anything and everything, especially differences
between averages for groups. Be skeptical of anyone who wants you to think it could be simple.
(They are not being true to the science of average group differences.) Instead, ask questions—dig
deeper into the complexity.
(Visual aids)

2. Reading
A famous debate occurred around 1970 between Jensen (1923-2012) an educational psychometrician
(analyst of psychological data) who believed that IQ was inherited and difficult to change and Lewontin (b.
1929), a population geneticist (evolutionary biologist) who argued that Jensen's method was flawed and
who believed that society had not tried very hard to boost intelligence. The reading does not include the
original Jensen article in the Harvard Educational Review because it is too long, so you have to discern
his arguments from Lewontin's account of them and Jensen's response to Lewontin. Read and unpack
their exchange by making up a charts along the following lines, where you add rows for each new point,
leave a cell blank if there is no response by the other person, and use "Notes" to record your response to
their points, e.g. What convinces you? What don't you understand? (It is difficult material so don't be
afraid to say when you don't follow the technicalities.) When you look at the exchange as a whole,
consider what political, social or other assumptions are involved in the argument. What actually gets
answered and what not?
Jensen’s arguments in Lewontin’s account

Lewontin on specific Notes
points of Jensen’s
arguments

e.g., because blacks perform, on average, more poorly than whites on

...................

...................

IQ tests, and because compensatory education programs have failed to
remove this difference (due to his hypothesis that IQ is genetic), there is
no use trying to remove the difference in IQ through education.
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...................

Jensen’s (re)view of his own arguments

Notes

e.g., It is necessary to look at individual differences rather than taking it as read that “all

...................

children are alike.” This could be more fruitful than large scale programs based on a
philosophy of general cultural enrichment.

Jensen on the points of Lewontin’s

Lewontin’s response to Jensen on his

account

(Lewontin’s) account

e.g., Lewontin’s paper has an ad

Notes

...................

hominem flavor.
Additional questions to prepare for class discussion: Jensen asserts that equal education does not work
and that we need education tailored to the individual needs of students. Does he give any evidence that
equal education had been attempted in the USA by the late 1960s? Do you know of any such evidence?
Who do you think would find his assertion plausible (c. 1970) with little or no evidence given? What is the
context that makes this plausible? If you need help thinking about these questions, do some internet
investigation.

3. Activity
Review the charts of arguments, counter-arguments, and missing arguments in the exchange
What can we do on the basis of the science of Jensen? Of Lewontin?
Review how this relates to the critical thinking theme of interpreting scientific ideas in relation to the
actions favored by the exponents of those ideas.

4. Synthesis and extensions
By unpacking the debate between Lewontin and Jensen, the following themes should emerge:
1. There are no simple explanation about genetics and socially significant traits, especially regarding
average racial differences. Therefore: be skeptical of anyone who proposes such an explanation (i.e.,
scrutinize where they are coming from).
2. There are researchers who have detailed technical cases to make (even if their conclusion is quite
simple, e.g., Jensen believes it is plausible that genes account for (average) racial differences). Their
arguments can be teased out into their components (in this case, with help from Lewontin, who can
handle the technical side and has views about the political/social implications and underpinnings of the
science).
3. What can we do (on the basis of the science) is worth asking of all sides. (Jensen thinks we have tried
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and failed to equalize education so educate people according to their innate capacities [actually, educate
people according to the typological generalization about the average differences between the races];
Lewontin thinks educational professionals have not tried very hard and when society is committed to
equalizing education ways will be found.)
Lewontin vs. Jensen debate
A famous debate c. 1970 between an educational theorist (Jensen) who believed that IQ was inherited
and difficult to change and a geneticist (Lewontin) who argued that Jensen's method was flawed and who
believed that society hadn't tried very hard to boost intelligence (pjt).
Precis (by JanCoe) of Lewontin, R. (1976). “Race and Intelligence (and Jensen's reply, and Lewontin's
reply to that).” In The IQ Controversy: Critical Readings, ed. N. J. Block and A. Dworkin. NY: Pantheon,
78-112
Jensen’s arguments in Lewontin’s analysis

Lewontin on specific points of Jensen’s
arguments

Jensen’s overall argument is that: because blacks
perform, on average, more poorly than whites on
IQ tests, and because compensatory education
programs have failed to remove this difference
(due to his hypothesis that IQ is genetic), there is
no use trying to remove the difference in IQ
through education.
Since compensatory education has failed,

Jensen’s professionalist bias that makes him take the

shouldn’t we inquire why that is so?

position that if a problem were soluble, it would have
been solved.

IQ tests are culture bound and there is good

Jensen is not arguing that that IQ is environmentally

reason they should be because they are predictors determined because it is culture bound. He is saying
of culture-bound activities and values and correlate that IQ is culture bound in the sense that it is related
highly with occupational status.

to performance in a Western industrial society. The
determination of the ability to perform a culturally
defined task might itself be entirely genetic.

If the poorer performance by blacks on IQ tests

Jensen has seen that this argument cuts both ways.

has largely genetic rather than environmental
causes, it follows that blacks are also genetically
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handicapped for other high status components of
Western culture.
Therefore, IQ testing is simply ONE manifestation
of these genetically determined differences.
In discussing the causes of the differences in IQ
results between blacks and whites, two issues
arise: 1) the stability of the IQ through an
individual’s lifetime; 2) the genetic basis of IQ.
“The literature” indicates that IQ is more or less set To say that children do not change their IQ is not the
by the age of 8.

same as saying that they cannot.

The genetic argument deals with the distribution

There is nothing in genetic theory that requires, or

and inheritance of intelligence. Jensen

even suggests, that a phenotypic character should

demonstrates that IQ scores are normally

be normally distributed.

distributed.
The “underlying normality” of the distribution

We cannot speak of a trait being molded by heredity,

appears as a consequence of the genetic control of as opposed to environment.
IQ.
Every character of an organism is the result of a
unique interaction between the inherited genetic
information and the sequence of environments
through which the organism has passed during its
development.
Heritability, its application to a specific population

The heritability of a measurement is defined as the

in a specific set of environments, and the

ratio of the variance due to the differences between

difficulties in its accurate estimation are all

the genotypes to the total variance in the

discussed by Jensen – he does grasp the technical populations. Different populations may have more or
issues involved.

less genetic variation for the same character.

Concerning the causes of the difference between

The evidence that Jensen has offered is

the IQ distribution of blacks and whites, Jensen

IRRELEVANT to the question. Jensen confuses the

concludes that genetic factors are strongly

heritability of a character within a population with the

implicated.

heritability of the difference between two populations.
The genetic basis of the difference between two
populations bears no logical or empirical relation to
the heritability between populations and cannot be
inferred from it.
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Jensen’s second conclusion is that compensatory It is empirically wrong to argue that, if the richest
education for blacks has failed.

environment experience we can conceive does not
raise IQ substantially, that we have exhausted the
environmental possibilities. The supposition that
compensatory education must fail arises from a
misapprehension about the fixity of genetic traits.

There is no reason to believe that the IQs of

On the reasonable assumption that ways of

deprived children, given an environment of

significantly altering mental capacities can be

abundance, would rise to a higher level than the

developed if it is important enough to do so, the real

already privileged children’s IQs.

issue is what the goals of our society will be.

Jensen’s (re)view of his own arguments
Based on the massive evidence presented by the Civil Rights Commission that compensatory programs
have produced no significant improvement in measured intelligence or scholastic performance of
disadvantaged children, merely to apply more of the same will not likely lead to the desired results.
It is necessary to look at individual differences rather than taking it as read that “all children are alike.”
This could be more fruitful than large scale programs based on a philosophy of general cultural
enrichment.
His theory is that there are two broad categories of mental abilities: intelligence and associative leaning
ability. Large racial and social differences are found for intelligence but negligible differences for
associative learning abilities.
IQ ability is a selection of just one portion of the spectrum of human mental abilities, but is important to
our society
The methods and evidence he reviewed in his paper led him to his conclusion that individual differences
in intelligence are predominately attributable to genetic differences. He notes the lack of heritability
studies in the minority populations and says they are needed to increase understanding of what our tests
measure in those populations.
IQ differs, on average, among children from different social class backgrounds and the evidence
indicates to him that some of this is attributable to environmental differences and some to genetic
differences among social classes.
Social scientists decree on purely ideological grounds that all races are identical in the genetic factors
that condition various traits, including intelligence.
But nearly every anatomical, physiological, and biochemical system investigated shows racial
differences. Why should the brain be any exception? A genetic hypothesis is not unwarranted.
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A problem that is more socially important than the question of racial differences per se, is the dysgenic
trends that can be observed. That is, if the poorest blacks keep having the most children, then the
genetic intelligence difference between whites and backs could widen even further.

Jensen on the points of Lewontin’s analysis

Lewontin’s response to Jensen on his
(Lewontin’s) analysis

Jensen’s article is not an objective empirical scientific
paper that stands or falls on the correctness of his
calculation of heritability. It is a closely-reasoned
ideological document springing from a professionalist
bias and permeated with an elitist and competitive
worldview.
Lewontin’s paper has an ad hominem flavor.

There was no ad hominem argument in
Lewontin’s analysis.

He agrees with Lewontin that the assumptions, theories
and practices of educators, social and behavioral
scientists are bankrupt.
Re: Lewontin’s remark “to say that children do not
change their IQ is not the same as saying that they
cannot” – Jensen has never said anything to the contrary.
Re: Lewontin’s argument that heritability of a trait within a
population does not prove that genetic factors are
involved in the mean difference between two different
populations on the same trait – is one that Jensen never
advocated. It is a straw man argument set up by
Lewontin.
Theoretically, Lewontin’s statement that heritability within Jensen has responded to Lewontin’s major
populations is irrelevant to the question of genetic

scientific thrust at his thesis by saying that he

differences between differences is true; however, it is

(Lewontin) has demanded an unrealistic

necessary to distinguish between the possible and the

(mathematical) level of proof.

probable. The real question is not whether a heritability
estimate, by its mathematical logic, can prove the
existence of a genetic difference between two group, but
whether there is any probabilistic connection between the
magnitude of the heritability an the magnitude of the
group differences.

74

Lewontin makes no comment about the dysgenic trends The evidence Jensen uses for dysgenic trends
discussed in his paper.

is indirect. Geneticists who used to make
these arguments were proven wrong by Carl
Bajema, who showed that this argument was
based on an egregious statistical error: they
forgot to count women who had no children.

In the final analysis, the main point for Lewontin remains:
even if the difference between black and white were
entirely genetic, what program for social action would
flow from that fact?
We are forced to examine all possible reasons for

Nonsense. What we are morally obliged to do

inequality. Society will benefit most if scientists and

is to eliminate blackness as a cause of

educators treat these problems in the spirit of scientific

unequal treatment – and for that program we

inquiry rather than as a battlefield upon which one of

have no need of genetics. The decision about

another preordained ideology may seemingly triumph.

what role each child is to play eventually in
society and what rewards he will receive is
social.

•

At many places in the genes & intelligence debate assumptions have to be made which are not
dictated by what natural reality is like. E.g. conceiving of intelligence as one thing vs. a diversity of
types of intelligence; measuring intelligence on one scale vs. a diversity of scales vs. not measuring it
at all.

•

Many definitions of intelligence(s) exist; they differ along many dimensions: innate <-> trained;
unchangeable <-> changeable; single <-> multiple; testable <-> not; can be used to enhance life
possibilities <-> to restrict; predictive of socially valued outcomes <-> not; inside person <-> in
relationships. If you choose one, e.g., what IQ tests measure, and study its heritability or its
alterability, you then have to show whether and how this extends to other definitions of intelligence.

5. Connections and resources
American Psychological Association (2001). "New model of IQ development accounts for ways that even
small environmental changes can have a big impact, while still crediting the influence of
genes." www.apa.org/releases/iqmodel.html (Apr. 15).
•

Introduces a model that allows for both the increase in average IQ test scores each generation (the
Flynn effect) and the high heritability of IQ test scores.
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Taylor, P. J. (2014) Nature-Nurture? No: Moving beyond the gaps in the sciences of variation and
heredity" Arlington, MA: The Pumping Station—from page 41:
•

[Lindman says] “the observed differences between schools” when referring to the observed
differences between averages for schools. It is still commonplace to hear typological expressions of
the kind “men are taller than women,” “men tend to be taller than women,” or “men are, on average,
taller than women.” Some might dispute the label typological, saying that the implicit variation is
understood. They might see little to be gained by wordier statements that make the variation explicit,
such as, “the variation among men’s heights centers at a point that is greater than the center of the
variation among women’s heights,” or “the variation among men’s heights and the variation among
women’s heights overlap, but some of the men’s variation lies to the right of the women’s variation
and some of the women’s lies to the left of the men’s.” However, can we be sure that it is simply
linguistic convenience to use simple expressions that put group or class membership first and
deviation as implicit or secondary? If not, the wordier, non-typological alternatives help keep in view
the possibility that the factors underlying the pattern in the data could vary among men and women
and need not include factors solely possessed by one sex or the other..."

Woodhead, M. (1988). "When psychology informs public policy." American Psychologist 43(6): 443-454.
•

Where Jensen concluded that early childhood education had not boosted IQ test scores in the 1960s,
subsequent research showed that in the longer term many other socially desirable measures, such as
high school graduation, did improve.

5b. Add to this blog post to provide suggestions and resources for revising the chapter.
5c. Adaptation of themes from the chapter to students' own projects of engaging your audience in
learning or critical thinking about biology in its social context: Suggestions for how to do that:
1. Identify writing where people speak about differences between groups as if everyone in each group
can be treated as if they were at the group average. (See examples above from Taylor 2014.)
2. Brainstorm with instructor.

76

Son's vs. father's height

Daughter's vs. mother's height

Student's vs. average of parents' height

Father's vs. mother's height

Plots of height measurements (in inches) for 63 college students and their parents.
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All possible phenomena
(-> experimental manipulation)
-> phenomenon deemed interesting
-> questions asked
-> categories demarcated
-> observations made
-> data collected
-> patterns perceived
-> predictions made
and/or hypotheses about causes
-> actions supported
A chain of steps in scientific inquiry in which each step involves assumptions and is open for
negotiation and wider influences. The dashed lines depict the possibility that desired
outcomes for the later stages influence decisions made at earlier steps.
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IQ test score

IQ test score

What would you do on the basis of these patterns?
e.g., Group 1 community leader: Push for better schools? Get depressed
because Group 2 will stay ahead…?

What more would you want to know about these
patterns before you decided what to do?
e.g., IQ researcher: Work with geneticist to look for genes that group 2 have
that group 1 doesn’t…
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Social negotiations around genetic screening
1. Introduction
The debate about the changeability of IQ test scores (Jensen vs. Lewontin) referred to the heritability of
IQ test scores, but no actual genes. It also referred to the limitations and possibilities of education, but did
not focus on specific educational projects—how they succeeded or failed and in what circumstances. In
contrast, this session examines how specific groups (or "voices") in society shape or are involved in the
application of knowledge about specific genes.
1b. Mini-lecture
•

PKU--Substituting a genetic condition for chronic illness and second-generation effects

•

Initial look at intersecting processes (which is the focus of next chapter)
(Visual Aids)

2. Reading
•

Preview the activity for the class (#3).

•

While reading Rapp, "Moral pioneers" and Paul, "The history of newborn phenylketonuria screening",
make notes to help you contribute to the activity.

•

Secondary task: As you read Paul, use what she describes about the history to create a multistranded timeline (analogous to the ones in the mini-lecture), where time goes from pre-1960s to
1990s and the strands might include PKU people; diagnosis; care; social support and regulation;
advocacy; research/science; and wider social context. Do not worry about getting this neat—it is
simply an initial exercise in diagramming intersecting processes, which is the topic of the next
session.

Paul, D. (1997). "Appendix 5. The history of newborn phenylketonuria screening in the U.S.," in N. A.
Holtzman and M. S. Watson (Eds.), Promoting Safe and Effective Genetic Testing in the United States.
Washington, DC: NIH-DOE Working Group on the Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of Human
Genome Research,137-159.
•

Precis TBA

Rapp, R. "Moral Pioneers: Women, Men & Fetuses." Women & Health 13 (1/2, 1988): 101-116.
•

Precis TBA

3. Activity
If the case of phenylketonuria (PKU) is any guide (Paul 1998), significant complexities should be
expected to arise if neonatal genetic diagnosis and advice about risks and about possible protective
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measures become widespread. Moreover, just as PKU individuals are subject to diverse influences on
their pathways of development over the life course (Rapp 1988), there are diverse influences to which
PKU individuals are subject on their pathways of development over their life course.
In this light, design a forum to help supplement advances in genetic screening by leading communities to
develop
a) greater tolerance for normal variation;
b) social measures to care for people suffering from abnormal variation; and/or
c) multiple voices/constituencies/ethical positions around gene-based medicine.
Steps
a. Guided freewriting: "My experience of tolerance (or intolerance) of normal variation, of caring (or lack of
caring), and of discussion about gene-based medicine makes we think about...."
b. Discussion in pairs about what forms a "forum" could take.
c. Web-searching to learn about existing models of forums of the kind you consider in #b. Consult with
instructor at some time during the searching step or the next design step.
d. Design a forum, making clear:
i) What kind of forum;
ii) Which of goals it focuses on and what specific issues/questions;
iii) What the audience would be;
iv) How it might be organized (what people or groups to get involved, etc.);
v) How you would assess whether it helped and how to improve it; and
vi) How it draws on what you learned from the readings (Paul, Rapp, and any others you find).
e. Present to class, 5 minutes each, with each student giving Plus-Delta feedback: Feedback that begins
with an appreciation (plus or +) before making a suggestion for change (delta or Δ).

4. Synthesis and extensions
•

Rapp draws our attention to many constituencies and voices in the arena or reproductive
interventions, in contrast to the dominance of white, male experts and a medical model: "Until we
locate and listen to the discourses of women who encounter and interpret a new reproductive
technology in their own lives, we cannot go beyond a medical model." Medical model = individual
risks, benefits and choices (aided by dominant metaphors of human perfectibility and individuals
holding within them their potential) vs. situated, social responses, e.g. social support for the disabled,
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Down syndrome support groups.
•

Genetic purification—Consider this strong proposition: "I have heard some argue that prenatal
diagnosis and selective abortion would reduce society’s burden in having to give special care for very
disabled people and thus free funds for general health care, education, etc. for the mildly disabled. I
have also heard the strong counter-proposition that such “genetic purification” in practice works
against tolerance for the usual range of variation and measures to care for the abnormal. To
understand the logic of this proposition consider an analogy: The health and fitness boom of the
1980s seems to have reduced tolerance for plump, “overweight” people. Those who have kept
themselves trim tend to think that overweight people ought also to be able to do something about
their figures. In the light of this analogy, Rapp's articles, your own experience, and research into the
published literature, discuss the contention about “genetic purification."
o

Genetic purification thought-piece by student in 2006

5. Connections and resources
Taussig, K. S. et al. (2003) “Flexible Eugenics: Technologies of the Self in the Age of Genetics”. Pp. 5876 in Alan Goodman, Deborah Heath and Susan Lindee, eds. Genetic Nature/ Culture: Anthropology and
Science Beyond the Two Culture Divide. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pdf
•

Genes and Human Disease, World Health Organization

Yoxen, E. “Unnatural selection/Gene Therapy.” In Unnatural Selection?, Pp. 157-173. London:
Heinemann, 1986.
•

Sequence of potential developments (Yoxen): prenatal screening & selective abortion -> somatic cell
therapy -> germ cell (&early embryo) modification -> enhancement of specific genetic traits ->
enhancement of more complex attributes.

•

Although, in Yoxen’s view, there is no absolute technological inevitability in this sequence, each step
would make the next more feasible. Yoxen proposes that the public should discuss the implications
and so individuals can make choices that enhance their freedom, self-esteem and sense of
responsible reproductive behavior. (How else could limits be implemented that check commodification
and technological development? What contradicts these social determinisms?)

•

Public discussion of science does not necessarily mean direct involvement in technicalities, because
public discussion that affects the possible directions of science does not stop with technical issues -the gay liberation movement in the 70s made it possible for people to lobby hard for more AIDS
research in the 80s while they probably would not have been listened to a decade earlier. Scientists
who invoke fear of the public’s direct involvement in technicalities may be suspected of having an
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interest in limiting public involvement or influence in political decision-making concerning the direction
of science.
5b. Online forum, through which students can provide suggestions and resources for revising the chapter
5c. Adaptation of themes from the chapter to students' own projects of learning about or engaging with
biology in its social context: Suggestions for how to do that:
•

Design a forum that brings out multiple voices in your audience so as to enhance the critical thinking
everyone does about your topic concerning biology in its social context.
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PKU
personʼs
condition

lower IQs & other deficits
teratogenic effects
on fetus

diagnosis neonatal
& care
special diet

social
support mandated
testing

wider
biomedical
social
vs. psych.
context
birth

medical, social, psych, rehab
services
hard to maintain diet...............

subsidy &
drug status
(till 1972)

religious & ethnic identity

cure vs.care of chronic
5/6

teenager

young
adulthood

Intersecting processes over the life course of individuals with PKU
(Single gene mutation -> early biochemical diagnosis -> lifelong management of chronic condition
Including: ongoing struggle to secure health insurance coverage for diet ands to enlist family/peer
support for staying on diet. Possibility of “maternal PKU”)
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Multiple voices speak to PGD and "genetic purification" Jan Coe (2006)

The contention that the utilization of services such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)
and selective abortion would reduce the burden on society for caring for very disabled people
while freeing funds to support less-disabled persons is debatable. One might similarly ask whether
the utilization of radical mastectomies by women has lead to more funding for breast cancer
research. The two are not necessarily, or causally, related. The more compelling implicit question
is whether utilizing PGD may amount to practicing “genetic purification.”
To examine this claim thoroughly, one must declare at the outset: it depends upon who you ask.
As with most complex, multidimensional problems, the answer is likely to be different according to
who is given voice.
This discussion will enlist the voices from three groups: 1) people with disabilities (although it is
acknowledged at the outset that there is no such homogenous entity as “the disabled
community”), 2) bioethicists, 3) social scientists and health/medical personnel. Addressing facets
of the claim may yield an incremental construction for an answer more rich and nuanced by being
constituted from different stakeholders.
The Council on Responsible Genetics, a non-profit organization that fosters public debate about
the social, ethical and environmental implications of genetic technologies, sees the lack of a
“bright line” between selection against disability, condition, or trait as a problem. “Routinizing the
practice of testing can open the door to termination of individuals for a great many characteristics,
including non-medical ones like sex selection” (2001, CRG). The Council believes, as the scenario
suggests, that such routinizing will lessen people’s acceptance of unusual characteristics and lead
to devaluing the people who exhibit them. They point out that the attempt to eliminate disabilities
through PGD and/or selective abortion is misguided in any case because a majority of disabilities
are acquired through accidents and other environmental causes. Rather than forcing women and
families to become “quality control agents,” the CRG feels that they should be assisted by
economic and social supports to enable them to raise disabled children without going broke.
An argument often made by disability activists is that the so-called medical model characterizes
disability as a source of suffering, a deviation from the “norm,” an illness or a condition that needs
to be treated or cured. Yet there is much evidence that disabled people themselves do not feel
this way. In a table that compares self-esteem ratings by non-disabled people, non-disabled
people imagining themselves with a severe spinal cord injury, and members of a spinal cord injury
survivors group, Gregor Wolbring shows that people with actual spinal cord injury have
significantly higher feelings of self esteem that do people who only imagine how they would feel if
they had that injury. Strikingly, 95% of the survivor group agreed with the statement “I feel that I
am a person of worth,” while only 55% of those imagining themselves with spinal cord injury (SCI)
did. 83% of those imagining themselves with SCI agreed with the statement “At times I feel no
good at all,” but only 39% of people with actual spinal cord injury did. And these are not isolated
findings (Wolbring, 2002, p.28)
In contrast to a medical model, disability activists advocate a social model of disability which sees
the actual condition, be it Down syndrome, cystic fibrosis, achondroplasia or deafness, as an
impairment; the “disability” relates to the array of barriers, attitudes and lack of opportunities that a
disabled person faces in society. This model does not deny that the biological realities faced by
disabled people are insignificant, but it views them more on a continuum of difference rather than
abnormalities. For example, the Canadian Down Syndrome Society “redefined” the definition of
DS in 2003. They state that:
Down syndrome is a naturally occurring chromosomal arrangement that has always been a part of
the human condition… Down syndrome is not a disease, disorder, defect or medical condition. It is
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inappropriate and offensive to refer to people with Down syndrome as "afflicted with" or "suffering
from" it. Down syndrome itself does not require either treatment or prevention… The sole
characteristic shared by all persons with Down syndrome is the presence of extra genetic material
associated with the 21st chromosome. The effects of that extra genetic material vary greatly from
individual to individual. Persons with Down syndrome karyotypes may be predisposed to certain
illnesses and medical conditions, but that genetic arrangement does not guarantee their
development. The same illnesses and conditions are also present in the general population.
Timely and accurate diagnosis and appropriate treatment of these illnesses and conditions
improves both the length and quality of life, to the same extent as would be expected in the
population without Down syndrome… (CDSS, 2003).
When viewed through the social perspective of disability activists, it is clear that what drives the
move to prevent children being born with a disability is the discrimination experienced by disabled
people (Shakespeare, 2005). Fear of how they would cope with the demands of a disabled infant
and cognizant of the negative stereotypes that attend to seeing disabled people in public, it is
understandable that many parents would choose to avoid having a disabled child. And yet, as
Shakespeare notes, “while the question of disability is individualized and privatized, the broader
question, about how society supports disabled children and their families, is neglected”
(Shakespeare, 2005, p. 47).
Whether multiple “individual” decisions by parents utilizing PGD to choose non-affected embryos
will ultimately give rise to eugenics in the societal or population-based sense is contested. Part of
what muddies the situation is the issue of autonomy – the idea that individual women (and
parents) should be able to choose to terminate a pregnancy based on their own personal values
and beliefs. Some disability activists would say that such autonomy is illusory because genetic
counseling by medical personnel is one-sided and based primarily on medical perspectives.
Parents are thus predisposed to negatively view the choice to have a disabled child. Pilnick (2002
cited in Pritchard, 2005) states that prenatal screening is undertaken with the principle of informed
refusal, rather than informed consent. Pilnick argues that women are obliged to become
increasingly dependent on the medical profession through the medicalization of pregnancy. And
although genetic counselors strive to be nondirective, the mere fact that such counseling exists in
a medical context is part of the message. Later on, we will see that Rapp (1998) and Wertz (2000)
show the medical establishment is not unchallenged by parents, however. Many interpretations
and internalizations confound a single framework in which to understand the meaning of disability.
For another perspective on the issue of PGD and genetic purification, we turn now to the views of
bioethicists. The same caveat applies here – there is no one view or model that prevails. Along a
continuum of the acceptability of PGD, there are several positions to be found. Savulescu (2001)
provides a rationale for accepting what he terms the “eugenic” selection of embryos afforded by
PGD by employing his principle of “Procreative Beneficence.” This principle makes genetic testing
a moral obligation, for parents should select the child of the possible children they could have,
who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the others, based on the
relevant, available information (Savulescu, 2001, p. 415). This view seems to place an inordinate
confidence in presumably scientifically-derived “relevant” genetic information. All things being
equal, he says, why not select the embryo with no predisposition to asthma, for example. This is
extraordinary because, even if a gene for asthma (or any other trait or condition) is found in the
DNA of the embryo, its mere presence is not sufficient to cause the disease to develop in the
child. Savulescu then effects a fine tuning of his argument by stating that it is not asthma, per se,
which is important, but its impact on a life in ways that matter which is important (p. 419). The best
life, according to Savulescu, is the life with the most well-being. Through a circuitous route by
reference to various theories of well-being, it seems that Savulescu understands the best life to be
that defined by a person who is capable of understanding that they enjoy the best life possible.
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Moving to a defense of his views against the “Disability Discrimination Claim,” Savulescu uses a
hypothetical rubella epidemic to argue that doctors should encourage women to use embryos
which they produced prior to the epidemic in preference to ones produced during the epidemic.
The reason is that “it is bad that blind and deaf children are born when sighted and hearing
children could have been born in their place” (2001,p. 423). Bad for whom, or to whom, one
wonders. No doubt to temper the baldness of this statement, Savulescu adds in the following
sentence that to say this does not necessarily imply that the lives of those with disability are less
deserving of respect and are less valuable. “It is important to distinguish between disability and
persons with disability.” He offers the comment that no doubt gave rise to this scenario: “there are
better ways to make statements about the equality of people with disability (e.g. we could direct
savings from selection against embryos/fetuses with genetic abnormalities to improving well-being
of existing people with disabilities)” (2001, p. 423). As noted at the beginning of this discussion,
the notion that ‘savings’ would accrue from PGD techniques is highly questionable, and that these
hypothetical savings could be directed to improving the well being of disabled people flies in the
face of current reality.
A vastly different perspective on disability is offered by Tom Koch. The medical model of disability
is an outcome, he says, of “an ideology defining the limited variations permitted in the construction
of difference in contemporary society” (Koch, 2005). As with elements of the Savulescuian notion
of well-being, the medical model posits “an individual as a discrete, self-reliant, self-conscious
person with a store of goods at least equal to others’ in society. To be disabled is thus to have a
lesser endowment, to be unable to experience the world in a way similar to that of other, similarly
discrete individuals” (Koch, 2005, p. 124). In opposition to the ‘ideology of normalcy,’ Koch favors
the ideology of difference, in which “all discrete individuals are by definition assumed to be
incomplete and un-able, gaining full personhood only interpersonally and socially” (2005, p. 124).
Similar to the studies mentioned by Wolbring in the previous section, Koch finds that the claims by
disabled people that their lives were full and equal “were assumed to be not rational
but rationalizations because their insistence violated assumptions of bioethical and clinical life
quality based on a standard of mundane normalcy” (2005, p. 127, italics in original). While his
position on the termination of embryos through PGD is unknown, it can be inferred to be the same
as his position on abortion, euthanasia, and suicide: that they are based on ‘negative deviations
from the mundane norm’ and thus cannot be supported.
Peter Singer is a bioethicist who riles a good many people, not the least of whom are disability
activitists. In a response to Koch’s article, he takes the opportunity to set the record straight
regarding what have been regarded as his controversial views on disability, and in particular,
disabled fetuses or infants. Singer makes a distinction between a person living with a disability,
which he would support fully in terms of integrating into the community and in living and working
as ‘normally’ as they possibly could, and a fetus that has a gross disability (such as anencephaly)
because the fetus would have no chance of becoming a unique, rational, self-aware being (Singer,
2005). On the other hand, he does not believe that newborn infants have the capacities that
distinguish a fully grown, rational, self-aware human being nor does he believe that the potential of
a being is enough to make it wrong to kill that being (2005, p. 131). This seems to allow a lot of
leeway for disposing of fetuses and newborns, however. If the criteria of being and personhood do
not inhere until adulthood (or near adulthood), surely Singer would not condone the killing of
children or teenagers! Singer skirts this implication by stating that “the fact that a being is capable
of understanding that it has “a life,” and of having hopes and plans for how that life will go, does
make it worse, other things being equal, to end that life” (2005, p. 131).
A call for an agenda for bioethics on disability was made by Kuczewski in 2001. Without going into
all five convictions to guide bioethicists that Kuczewski enumerated, it is helpful to consider some
of the peer commentaries that accompanied his article. In particular, Alan Regenberg dissects the
quote that headed the Kuczewski article:
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If I were listing the most dangerous people in the U.S. today, bioethicists, aka medical ethicists,
would top my list – way above skinheads, whose beliefs they appear to share. -- (1994, Alice
Mailhot, notdeadyet.org)
Regenberg makes the point that academic bioethicists are often guilty of writing for their academic
audiences in ways that are likely to mislead and enflame parties not familiar with that style of
discourse. In particular, Singer’s “sin” was failing to adapt his claims to an “appropriate format
capable of responding to the vociferous critiques of his detractors” (Regenberg, 2001). Regenberg
does not consider the merits of the various claims, but rather highlights the need for bioethicists to
access the skills needed to bridge gaps between concerned parties in these ethical debates,
something that Wolbring, in his commentary reiterates once again. As he pithily notes, “we would
not accept a debate about women’s health without women being present, and in the same spirit
we should not accept a debate about bioethical issues without disabled people present (Wolbring,
2001, p.2). For his part, Singer’s commentary on Kuczewski’s article raises a valid, but
uncomfortable point. He asks rhetorically, who decides [about quality of life] for those with
profound intellectual disabilities? There has been a tendency, Singer continues, for people with
physical disabilities, but normal intellectual abilities, to regard themselves as spokespeople for
those whose intellectual disabilities preclude them from representing themselves. “It isn’t clear to
me why the fact that an articulate, intelligent person is in a wheelchair makes that person a better
representative of someone who has profound intellectual disabilities than someone equally
articulate and intelligent who is able to walk unaided” (Singer, 2001, p. 56).
Here it seems we come to the crux of why the issue of disability (not to mention disability and
PGD and genetic purification) is so troublesome: writers do not generally pre-define their
conceptions of disability – which can obviously range from minor physical features like cleft
palates or mongoloid features to severe mental retardation with few outward “abnormal”
characteristics. Infants with gross deformities such as anencephaly are lumped in with spinal cord
injuries, cerebral palsy or cystic fibrosis. Most of the medical vs. social debate is referring to
disabilities that allow at least some percentage of assisted functioning. Unless it is clear that one
is speaking, as Singer often does, of profound disabilities, people can continue to speak at cross
purposes. Additionally, outside of the bioethicists’ and disability advocates’ camps, the main
concern for parents may be not ‘normality’ but the appearance of normality that counts. To
consider why this may be so, we can turn to a rich literature generated by social scientists such as
anthropologists, child psychologists and psychiatrists, genetic counselors, clinical geneticists, and
health economists, which form the next section or perspective on the claim.
In order to address the views from social scientists, I have subdivided them into two categories:
those writers that report on actual studies with disabled people or parents/prospective parents of
disabled children, and writers who thoughtfully speculate on the outcomes, implications, and fears
that genetic advances and reproductive techniques will mean for future generations.
Starting with the work on amniocentesis by Rayna Rapp, it is apparent that the “lived experiences
of reproduction” need to be consulted as there is no universal explanation of why some women
are able to integrate a disabled child into their families and some try to prevent it. Rapp makes a
strong case for the insights that families with disabled children can contribute to scholarship. Here,
she says, “religion, ethnicity, class and family history powerfully shape responses to having a child
with a genetically stigmatized condition. Reflections on the meaning of maternity and paternity and
the value of children are embedded in the stories parents of the disabled tell as they transform
medical diagnosis into the social fabric of daily life” (Rapp, 1988). Her 1998 article on refusing
prenatal diagnosis is filled with grounding details arising from narratives that capture the variety
and logics that women and families use to make sense of positive diagnoses of disability.
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Class differences (finely calibrated, however), ethnicity, previous reproductive history, gender
relations, familiarity with the statistical delivery of risk information given by genetic counselors – all
play a part in how a woman internalizes and acts (or does not act) on the prospect of bearing a
disabled child. Paradoxically, for a condition such as Down syndrome, about which there is both
ample information and advocacy/support groups, there is also a very high – 90 to 95% - abortion
rate. Rapp tells the story of a certain young woman (whose family included a sister with spina
bifida) that became pregnant and went for prenatal tests. Relieved that her fetus did not have
spina bifida, the young woman was philosophical about the prospects for her child –
which was diagnosed with Klinefelter’s syndrome. Growth problems, sterility, and possible
learning disabilities or mild mental retardation are features of Klinefelter’s, but these problems
were less salient when the young woman was told that her son would “look normal.” As Rapp puts
it, it was the relative invisibility of the consequences of her son’s atypical chromosomes that made
them normal in her estimation (Rapp, 1998, p.64).
There is something in this story that resonates with Koch’s ideology of normalcy in terms of the
exception proving the rule. Were there not unambiguous pressure to adhere to the accepted
norm, especially in physical presentation of symptoms, people might be more forgiving of
deviations from that norm, especially since greater anomalies may hide within a “normal” body.
Götz and Götz (2006) provide additional complexity to the question about how parents react to
prenatal diagnosis and PGD. Their study of parents of children with cystic fibrosis who were
initially determined to use prenatal testing but eventually refused it allowed them to posit a model
of change that contextualizes and refutes the proponents of more static models of disabilities.
Among the explanations given for their change of heart, parents mentioned seeing their first child
grow and develop favorably in many ways, gaining experience with the disease, and feeling more
confident with the management of its complex treatment (2006, p. 295). It is also instructive to
follow the stages in their model of change. Beginning at stage 1 with information and counseling,
through stage 2 to what can be a lengthy period of absorbing information and developing new
concepts, the crunch comes at stage 3, when a pregnancy means that action is required. Götz
and Götz found that many parents – faced with the choice to “play God” ultimately refuse to do so,
preferring to delegate decision-making to fate, or, in some cases, God (2006, p. 297). These
results call into question the assumption that because parents are now able to select against
disability, they will in all cases.
A study showing a preference for PGD among those patients who have undergone previous
terminations lends some support to the claim that PGD could be a valuable alternative to prenatal
diagnosis -- as well as confirming that the procedure is highly stressful. Lavery and others (2002)
received 36 completed questionnaires from 67 they sent to patients who had actually undergone
PGD. They found that the main advantage articulated by patients was being able to avoid the
“therapeutic” termination of pregnancy (2002, p. 2466). Disadvantages included the low ‘takehome baby’ rate of 15-20% per cycle started, and cost.
Priscilla Alderson reports from her exploratory qualitative research with 40 adults with congenital
conditions, including 5 with Down syndrome, that some people with Down syndrome live creative,
rewarding and fairly independent lives, and are not inevitably noncontributing dependents
(Alderson, 2001, p. 627). While conceding that her study may have involved exceptionally able
people, Alderson is correct that:
…the potential of people with learning difficulties will not be realised until they have many more
opportunities to develop it. Research which enquires beyond morbidity into people’s potential and
achievements, and the social influences which support or constrain them, is required before their
ability can be assessed realistically. Such research moves on from notions of fixed (dis)ability,
static syndromes, expert researchers and inadequate subjects, to acknowledge how the research
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questions, methods, interactions during interviews, and hidden assumptions about medical or
social models of disability, all shape the data (2001, p. 636).
There is a case to be made for more research that examines the social context of the lives of
disabled people, much as Shakespeare has done with the AnSWeR web site (Antenatal
Screening Web Resource). Alderson raises a troubling point by questioning whether Down
syndrome began to be screened because this was technically possible rather than because it was
the most serious condition. Before the numbers of Down syndrome people fall through prenatal
testing and PGD, she stresses that it is important that more research be conducted to enable
broader, more realistic evidence about the range of ability among people with Down syndrome,
and about links between intellectual ability, contentment and self-esteem, noting that the general
population shows no clear correlations and that life style may be more salient than intelligence to
quality of life (2001, p. 636). [This is a point that high profile persons such as James Watson may
profit from considering, given his views.]
In a broad-ranging international study, Wertz (1997) surveyed the ethical views of genetics
professionals from 37 nations based on their responses to information presented in the form of
case vignettes. The surveys took place in 1985-86 and again in 1994-95 and provide a wealth of
information, statistics, and cross-cultural comparisons.
The differences are revealing between geneticists, genetic counselors, and patients in terms of
which fetal conditions for which they would choose to abort. Of the 24 conditions, a majority of the
geneticists, both inside and outside the United States, would themselves abort for 15. In the
United States, 85% would abort for Down syndrome, 92% for severe, open spina bifida, 74% for
cystic fibrosis, 72% for Huntington disease, and 56% for achondroplasia. A majority of the U.S.
genetic counselors would abort for 11 of the 24 conditions, while among patients (91% women)
only a small majority would abort for four of the 24 conditions. As Wertz notes in something of an
understatement, “the results suggest that there is room for considerable further research on how
the different worldviews [among geneticists, genetic counselors, and patients] are mutually
understood in the process of counseling, if indeed they are understood” (Wertz, 1997, XI.,¶8).
Pertinent to the topic of PGD and genetic purification, it is worthwhile to go back and consider the
encounter with the medical personnel (M.D. geneticist or Master’s level genetic counselor) from
whom parents first receive the news about a positive diagnosis. On questions relating to
nondirectiveness (what Wertz called the “motherhood and apple pie” statement of U.S. genetic
counseling) there was no evidence that this is what people really want (1997, IX., ¶4). While
parents would resent being told what to do in this context, they also appeared to want more than a
‘value-neutral’ information machine. Moreover, Wertz says, they want to think that they are facing
a human being who has a set of values and who cares about them and about their own values
and concerns.
This dovetails with Rapp’s findings that structural reasons for accepting or refusing prenatal
testing can even be influenced by the characteristics and staffing of prenatal clinics. Writing about
the variation between clinics on the acceptance rates of genetic testing, she notes that in one
clinic with a 70-80% acceptance rate, the clinic provided a stable and welcoming environment in
which the women tended to feel comfortable and to trust the nurses. At another clinic that had
been a ‘site of struggle over services’ for many years, the acceptance rate was 30–40%. At this
clinic the waiting times were long, there was poor professional-patient communication, and it was
“much more likely that a woman [would] break a counseling appointment or sit through it in a state
of distrust….Acceptance rates are conditioned by the microsociology of access to respectful
medical services” (Rapp, 1998, p. 53).
It is worth remembering that before we make assumptions about genetic purification, we need to
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think about how and in what manner people receive information about genetic testing; and before
we make assumptions about their willingness to use a reproductive technology like PGD, we need
to think about what circumstances brought them to the clinic or a referral to a geneticist; and
before we make assumptions that the information provided by the genetic counselor was
ultimately the point at which a decision was made, we need to think about “…economics, women’s
roles, services for children with disabilities, cultural expectations, availability of contraception,
[and] abortion.” The point is that there is necessarily not a linear route from diagnosis to test, and
from test to more tests and from more tests to genetic purification – the multidimensionality of the
issue means that at any point along the way people may choose differently and confound
expectations.
The final facets to confront include medical and non-medical factors that may have an impact
upon people’s willingness and/or capacity to utilize certain reproductive technologies like PGD.
These facets include policy issues, the availability of insurance, and the commercialization of
testing.
A glimpse at some of the applications to which PGD may be put in the future is outlined by
Robertson (2003). His purpose is to look ahead, assuming that current uses of PGD are “ethically
and legally acceptable when performed according to applicable regulatory guidelines” (Robertson,
2003, p. 466). Leaving aside the question of the existence and adequacy of ‘applicable
guidelines,’ one of the expanded uses of PGD could include routinizing services for the older
patient group (>39 years) such that aneuploidy (abnormal number of chromosomes) analysis
becomes the standard of care. Another growth area is likely in PGD for so-called susceptibility
conditions. Screening for BRCA1 and 2 [breast cancer] susceptibility is mentioned in the context
of avoiding the birth of children that face a higher than average risk of having cancer or some
other serious disease. Robertson states that PGD may now make it possible to establish
pregnancies free of the feared susceptibility condition (2003, p. 467).
In addition, there is now a precedent for using PGD for early-onset Alzheimer’s disease, although
it remains ethically ambiguous whether a parent who is dominant for the disease should be helped
to select a disease-free embryo that they will possibly not live long enough to rear. Other uses that
make headlines every now and then are the so-called “savior siblings” and PGD for sex selection
or “family balancing.” On the subject of using PGD for expressly non-medical traits, Robertson
reasons that “it is too soon to reach definitive judgments about whether these uses, if ever
feasible, would or should be permitted…Until they are closer to practical reality, they should not be
an important factor in determining the acceptability of more feasible uses” (2003, p. 470).
Unlike the U.K., which has the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) to regulate
and oversee existing and proposed uses of reproductive technologies, Robertson acknowledges
that the situation is quite different in the United States where no agency exists that plays a role
comparable with that of the HFEA. Despite this, he states that with PGD, the need for a new
agency or more explicit public controls may be less pressing than initially thought. Why? Because
“most of the new uses of PGD fit easily into old categories of efforts to ensure that offspring are
healthy” (p. 470). At the very least this seems to side-step or gloss over whether, in fact, selection
in all cases can be said to amount to ensuring the health of offspring.
The nexus of predictive medicine with insurance is another highly fraught arena, especially in the
United States. Van Hoyweghen and others make a compelling case for the shift in focus from
“…symptoms and treatment to pre-symptomatic diagnosis and preventative intervention” in the
insurance industry (Van Hoyweghen, 2006, p. 2). In their discussion on lifestyle risk factors, they
conclude that people with some lifestyle risk factors are seen by insurers as already ill and what is
more: as people responsible for causing their own illness and therefore deserving of an extra
premium (2006, p.4). On the face of it, this could work disadvantageously if applied to genetic
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conditions. Parents could feel pressured to ensure that they only produced those children that
were at least as healthy as possible at the start of their lives. Surprisingly, Van Hoyweghen reports
that – at least in Belgium (where the study was undertaken) – a different scenario obtains.
Restricted by law from using family history as a decisive risk factor, people who are at risk for
genetic conditions may instead be considered victims; their “bad genes” are outside their choice or
control (2006, p. 8). In this way, they see in Belgium the institutionalization of ‘genetic
essentialism’.
In the United States, Kaufert found that violation of privacy and the potential for genetic
discrimination loomed large. Among clinicians she found that the underlying and general concern
[was] how to counsel testing if the costs must be met out of third party insurance and result in a
patient losing both a job and insurance coverage. “It is not the fear of living with the cause of
death specified, but very pragmatic considerations of access to health care for oneself and one’s
family, and having a job” that mattered (Kaufert, 2000, p. 826). Although clearly of concern to
citizens, legislation in this regard has stagnated:
For over ten years, Congress has considered legislation to ensure comprehensive protection for
all Americans. The U.S. Senate passed the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003
(S.1053) [thomas.loc.gov] in 2003 by a vote of 95-0, but an identical bill was never introduced or
passed in the House and the bill did not become law. A similar Senate bill, the "Genetic
Information Non-Discrimination Act of 2005" (S.306), passed 98-0 in February 2005.
Representatives Judy Biggert (R-IL), Louise Slaughter (D-NY), Bob Ney (R-OH), and Anna Eshoo
(D-CA) introduced an identical bill H.R. 1227, in the House, on March 10, 2005. Currently the bill
is being considered by three House committees - the Committee on Education and the Workforce,
the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on Ways and Means. (NHGRI,
2006).
If the pace of government action in legislating against genetic discrimination has been glacial, the
same cannot be said for the genetic testing industry. Relative to earlier practice, Kaufert finds,
“…commercialization has…dramatically changed the context of testing, stripping it out of the clinic
and removing the intermediary roles of geneticists and genetic counselor” (2000, p. 823). Directto-consumer tests over the Internet have proliferated. This phenomenon so concerned the
Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society (SACGHS) that they wrote in
2004 to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Michael O. Leavitt, expressing “…a strong
concern that the promotion of such tests to consumers could be harmful if a health professional is
not involved in the process” (SACGHS, 2006). The outcome two years later is that two interagency work groups have been formed to monitor claims made by companies advertising genetic
tests on the Internet and to evaluate the public health impact of DTC marketing of genetic tests.
Some of the impacts upon people’s willingness and/or capacity to utilize certain reproductive
technologies like PGD may be quite tenuous, such as whether the rise in numbers of genetic tests
will substantially lead - if not to “designer babies” - then at least to a desire for “normal” i.e. nondisabled babies in all cases. There is more at stake than a slippery slope argument in these
debates. Whether the use of PGD will reduce society’s burden in having to care for very disabled
people may also turn on what conception of society we favor living in.
From this review of perspectives from disabled people, bioethicists, and social scientists and
others, it is clear that - at the very least - the path from using a reproductive technology like PGD
does not inexorably lead to genetic purification. The pressure to bear children who do not have a
disability might be balanced by research into the lives of disabled people that will give needed
information to those who doubt their ability to care for a child with special needs. Bioethicists may
take up Kuczewski’s suggestion that bioethicists imitate the legal profession and devote 5-10% to
pro bono work in areas related to disability: independent living, long-term care, rehabilitation care,
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and care of the indigent (Kuczewski, 2001, p.38). Certainly they should seek out and nurture an
ability to translate debates so that more views may be considered and claims may be accurately
appreciated and critiqued, as Regenberg suggests (2001). Genetic discrimination as an issue of
importance to all may be addressed in the next administration. All of these things are possible.
The most important wedge against genetic purification may also be the sheer numbers and variety
of individuals and couples who have a stake in allowing whether a deterministic future will go
forward. Each individual decision is important and each individual decision cannot be predicted
just by reference to the available technologies. Richard Ashcroft says, “…while we might regard
individual choices and societal change as disconnected, or our evidence so poorly predictive of
the connection between the two as ("from a policy point of view") better ignored, this seems to me
a moot point. What sort of society would it be like if we all chose in such ways? Or wanted to
(even if we were unable to do so in practice, or only few of us were)? One cannot simply dismiss
this question as not susceptible to a scientific answer. It is surely just the sort of question
philosophers and society at large are responsible for answering. For in the answer lies the
material for bringing the answer into effect. (Ashcroft, 2003, 219, my emphasis).
If the answer tilts toward variation and tolerance, we will find that we have the means to make that
a reality.
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Intersecting processes involving genes and environment
1. Introduction
This session extends perspectives from the previous two sessions—the debate about the changeability of
IQ test scores and the possible involvement of multiple voices in the application of knowledge about
specific genes—by tracing "intersecting processes"—the sequence of multiple causes building on each
other over the individual’s life history. This account of causality permits a number of conclusions about
nature-nurture debates:
•

Neither the unchangeability of genes nor the reliability of some gene- or biochemistry-based
intervention would prove that the genes are the most significant cause of the behavior or disease that
has been occurring in the absence of such treatment.

•

Critics of genetic explanations could dismiss the attribution of an individual’s behavior to genes (or
50% or 80% to genes) as a technically meaningless partitioning of variation without placing
themselves at the other pole from genetic determination. That is, they would not have to make the
counterclaim that the environment determines behavior or that, if the right environment were found,
any desired behavior could be elicited. An intersecting processes account addresses malleability or
immalleability of behavioral outcomes without ruling out genetic contributions.

•

Similarly, critics would not need to rest their case on demonstrations that behavioral genetics has
been or still is methodologically flawed, on textual deconstructions of the categories and rhetoric
employed, or on attributions of political bias to the supporters of behavioral geneticists. These are all
interesting, but, in light of an intersecting processes account of the behavior, not necessary for a
conceptual critique of genetic determinism.

•

There are multiple points of intervention or engagement that could modify the course of development.

1b. Mini-lecture
Intersecting processes in the social origins of mental illness
(Visual Aids)

2. Reading
The readings complicate the popular idea that human traits can be determined, say 60%, by genes and
the opposing idea that the environment shapes most socially significant traits. Make notes on the models
of complexities sketched in the readings.
American Psychological Association (2001). "New model of IQ development accounts for ways that even
small environmental changes can have a big impact, while still crediting the influence of
genes." http://www.apa.org/releases/iqmodel.html (Apr. 15).
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Paul, D. (1997). "Appendix 5. The history of newborn phenylketonuria screening in the U.S.," in N. A.
Holtzman and M. S. Watson (Eds.), Promoting Safe and Effective Genetic Testing in the United States.
Washington, DC: NIH-DOE Working Group on the Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of Human
Genome Research, 137-159.
Taylor, P. J. (2004). "What can we do? -- Moving debates over genetic determinism in new directions."
Science as Culture 13(3): 331-355.
The class activity will go beyond complicating ideas about direct determination of traits to using an
"intersecting processes" framework to map out bio-social processes of development of traits. We will start
with the history as told by Paul—complete or neaten up the secondary task from the Reading for last
session.

3. Activity
Diagramming of Intersecting Processes
(a teaching activity under development)
Peter Taylor, Draft 8 Feb 2004; revised 17 April 2005; revised 6 Nov 2012
Acknowledgement: This unit draws inspiration and some ideas from Matthew Puma’s adaptation of my
teaching about intersecting processes in CrCrTh 640 http://www.faculty.umb.edu/peter_taylor/64002.html) during Spring 2002.
Goals for students
1. to understand the development of biomedical and social phenomena in terms of linkages among
processes of different kinds and scales that build up over time—genetics, treatment, family and
immediate social context, social welfare systems and economics, wider cultural shifts, ….
2. to use graphic organizers to help them visualize such “intersecting processes” and to identify places
where detail is missing and where further inquiry is needed.
3. [depending on level of students and prior preparation] to contrast the implications of thinking in terms of
direct causation (like spokes going to a hub) with “heterogeneous construction,” my term for the following
ideas:
“a) Without any superintending constructor or outcome-directed agent,
b) many heterogeneous components are linked together, which implies that
c) the outcome has multiple contributing causes, and thus
d) there are multiple points of intervention or engagement that could modify the course of development. In
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short,
e) causality and agency are distributed, not localized. Moreover,
f) construction is a process, that is, the components are linked over time,
g) building on what has already been constructed, so that
h) it is not the components, but the components in linkage that constitute the causes. Points c) and f–h)
together ensure that
i) it is difficult to partition relative importance or responsibility for an outcome among the different types of
cause (e.g., 80% genetic vs. 20% environmental). Generally,
j) there are alternative routes to the same end, and
k) construction is "polypotent," that is, things involved in one construction process are implicated in many
others. Engaging in a construction process, even in very focused interventions, will have side effects.
Finally, points f) and k) mean that
l) construction never stops; completed outcomes are less end points than snapshots taken of ongoing,
intersecting processes” (Taylor 2001).
Instructions
Pre-session reading:
Paul, D. (1997). Appendix 5. The history of newborn phenylketonuria screening in the U.S. Promoting
Safe and Effective Genetic Testing in the United States. N. A. Holtzman and M. S. Watson. Washington,
DC, NIH-DOE Working Group on the Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of Human Genome
Research: 137-159. http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/research/fed/tfgt/appendix5.htm
Excerpt from Taylor (2001 or 2004) on the development of severe depression in a sample of working
class women.
Phase A: Mini-lecture to introduce the ideas under goals 1 and 2 and the use of diagrams to identify
missing detail (goal 3). Illustrated with diagrams of a) the development of severe depression in a sample
of working class women and b) the life-course of a female with PKU detected by neo-natal screening for
PKU (based on Paul 1997) and perhaps other cases. Followed by Question & Answer.
Phase B: Following the procedure below, diagram Paul (1997) article with respect to the routinization of
neo-natal screening for PKU in the United States. Followed by discussion of potential and limitations of
the diagramming activity (for discussion among colleagues or for teaching).
1. Identify important connections mentioned in the article between things in the following categories or
strands (open to adaptation): Experience of persons with PKU (condition, care, social support);
Advocacy (pro + con); State mandates & regulation; Research; and Wider social context.
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2. Arrange the things as well as you can given the information available on parallel strands according to
year (from 1930s to 1990s allowing more space for 1960 through 1980).
3. Draw dotted lines to show connections between things.
4. Identify connections about which you want to know more. Use the ideas under goal 3 as a checklist.
5. Note where these instructions were hard to put into practice.
Example of connection: enthusiasm for biomedical prevention of mental retardation over education/social
support/rehabilitation of retarded persons (wider social context) and promotion of PKU screening in
advance of research on effects of diet (state mandates & regulation/ research).
6. Share products and comment on them on the blog
Phase C (Advanced): Move from developing categories to interconnected strands for the explanation
given by a) Dickens and Flynn in APA (2001) for the generation-to-generation increase in IQ test scores;
or b) Barker as described in Taylor (2004) for early-life origins of chronic diseases of later life.

4. Synthesis and extensions
Soil erosion case followed by themes about intersecting processes: Post 1, post 2, post 3

5. Connections and resources
•

Whys to look for genes: Pros and complications--a compilation of series of blog posts

5b. Online forum, through which students can provide suggestions and resources for revising the chapter
Add to this blog post to make contributions to the revision of the case or to an annotated collection of new
readings and other resources related to the case.
5c. Adaptation of themes from the chapter to students' own projects of engaging others in learning or
critical thinking about biology in its social context: Suggestions for how to do that:
•

Choose a key reading related to your topic and lead your readers through the steps in making an
intersecting processes diagram to discussion of insights to be gained from that

•

Create a forum related to your topic in which participants contribute to a multi-level timeline
(e.g., http://bit.ly/sftptime).

•

Brainstorm with instructor
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Adapted from Bowlby (1988, p. 177). His schema is, in turn, adapted from Brown and Harris (1978, p.
265). Hypothetical genetic/biochemical strand added by Peter Taylor.
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An account of severe depression in working class London women
(from Taylor, P. J. (1995). Building on construction: An exploration of heterogeneous constructionism,
using an analogy from psychology and a sketch from socio-economic modeling. Perspectives on
Science, 3(1), 66-98.)
Consider the challenge of explaining some human behavioral characteristic, such as IQ, aggression,
schizophrenia, sexuality, a food preference, and so on. The conventional wisdom is that nature and
nurture interact to produce behaviors, just as they do for other human characteristics. It goes
something like this: "We are not yet sure how much is genetic, how much is environmental; it will
probably turn out to be some of both. Only extremists, motivated by some political agenda, insist that
behaviors are 100% genetic or 100% environmental." Since the 1980s, however, the genetic
contribution has been on the ascendant. The Minnesota study of twins raised apart, which eliminated
many of the methodological shortcomings of earlier studies, has promoted the view that many
behaviors have a more substantial genetic basis than previously thought—divorce rates, male
homosexuality, depression, and many more (Bouchard et al. 1990; McGue and Lykken 1992). The
possibility of molecular biology discovering genetic markers for various conditions has further
enhanced the behavioral genetics program (Aldhous 1992) and strengthened the dichotomy of genetic
versus environmental determination.
A less well-known body of research, initiated by the British sociologists Brown and Harris in the 1960s,
has interpreted the social origins of mental illnesses in a way that undercuts this genes-environment
dichotomization. This research suggests how apportioning behavior to genes or environment might not,
at least for those seeking to reduce the incidence of mental illness, be very helpful. To see how this
follows, let me sketch their explanation of acute depression in working-class women in London (Brown
and Harris 1978, 1989). I will also work in the extensions of their findings made by Bowlby, a
psychologist who focused on the long-term effects of different patterns of attachment of infants and
young children to their mothers (Bowlby 1988).
Four factors are identified by Brown and Harris as disproportionately true of women with severe
depression: a severe, adverse event in the year prior to the onset of depression; the lack of a
supportive partner; persistently difficult living conditions; and the loss of, or prolonged separation from,
the mother when the woman was a child (under the age of eleven). Bowlby interprets this last factor in
terms of his and others' observations of secure versus anxious attachment of infants and young
children to caregivers. In a situation of secure attachment the caregiver, usually the mother, is, in the
child's early years, "readily available, sensitive to her child's signals, and lovingly responsive when [the
child] seeks protection and/or comfort and/or assistance" (Bowlby 1988, p. 167). The child more boldly
explores the world, confident that support when needed will be available from others. Anxious

100

attachment, on the other hand, corresponds to inconsistency in, or lack of, supportive responses. The
child is anxious in its explorations of the world, which can, in turn, evoke erratic responses from
caregivers, and the subsequent attempt by the child to get by without the support of others.
The three strands of the figure above (class, family, psychology) combine the observations above to
explain the onset of serious depression. The factors are not separate contributing causes, like spokes
on a wheel, but take their place in the multi-stranded life course of the individual. Each line should be
interpreted as one contributing causal link in the development of the behavior. The lines are dashed,
however, to moderate any implied determinism; the links, while common, do not apply to all women at
all times, and are contingent on background conditions not shown in the diagram. For example, in a
society in which women are expected to be the primary caregivers for children (a background
condition), the loss of a mother increases the chances of, or is linked to, the child's lacking consistent,
reliable support for at least some period. Given the dominance of men over women and the social ideal
of a heterosexual nuclear family, an adolescent girl in a disrupted family or custodial institution would
be likely to see a marriage or partnership with a man as a positive alternative, even though early
marriages tend to break up more easily. In a society of restricted class mobility, working-class origins
tend to lead to working-class adulthood, in which living conditions are more difficult, especially if a
woman has children to look after and provide for on her own. In many such ways these family, class,
and psychological strands of the woman's life build on each other.
Suppose now, quite hypothetically, that certain genes, expressed in the body's chemistry, predispose a
child to being more anxious in attachment compared to other children, even those within the same
family. Suppose also that this inborn biochemistry (or the subsequent biochemical changes
corresponding to the anxiety) renders the child more susceptible to the biochemical shifts that are
associated with depression. (This hypothetical situation is depicted in the bottom strand of the figure.) It
is conceivable that early genetic or biochemical diagnosis followed by lifelong treatment with
prophylactic antidepressants could reduce the chances of onset of severe depression. This might be
true without any other action to ameliorate the effects of loss of mother, working-class living conditions,
and so on. There are, however, many other readily conceivable interventions to reduce the chances of
onset of depression, for example, counseling adolescent girls with low self-esteem, quickly acting to
ensure a reliable caregiver when a mother dies or is hospitalized, making custodial institutions or foster
care arrangements more humane, increasing the availability of contraceptives for adolescents,
increasing state support for single mothers, and so on. If the goal is reduction in the incidence of
severe depression for working-class women, the unchangeability of the hypothetical inherited genes
says nothing about the most effective, economical, or otherwise socially desirable intervention (or
combinations of interventions) to pursue.
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This account of the origins of acute depression in working-class women displays most of the features
[noted in the Introduction that are] associated with the idea that something is constructed:
•

Many different kinds of components are linked together over time, each step building on what has
already been constructed. This implies that:

•

The outcome has multiple contributing causes, and thus:

•

There are multiple points of intervention or engagement that could modify the course of
development.

Recall that deterministic accounts, in contrast, tend in the opposite direction:
•

The links between proposed causes and outcome are direct, e.g., severe depression is a
biochemical imbalance.

•

Few steps are involved in the construction and a single kind or small number of causes dominate.

•

Few opportunities arise for things to have happened differently, in particular, social policy will not
be able to change the outcome greatly.

Literature Cited
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Intersecting processes, illustrated and analyzed
(Extracted from Taylor, Peter J. 2005. Unruly Complexity: Ecology, Interpretation, Engagement. U.
Chicago Press.)
Intersecting processes is a term I use to help students and researchers conceptualize directions that
would address… complexity in socio-environmental studies... The term addresses the [need] to
analyze social and environmental change as something produced by intersecting economic, social and
ecological processes that operate at different scales requires attention to the ways these processes
transgress boundaries and restructure “internal” dynamics, thus ensuring that socio-environmental
situations do not have clearly defined boundaries and are not simply governed by coherent, internally
driven dynamics… I use the term intersecting processes to suggest that different strands can be
teased out in a somewhat disciplined fashion. This will be evident in the following presentation of a
case of soil erosion in a mountainous agricultural region in Oaxaca, Mexico, which I have based on the
analysis of Mexican colleagues Raúl García-Barrios and his brother Luis (García-Barrios and GarcíaBarrios 1990).
The severe soil erosion evident now in the municipality of San Andrés is not the first occurrence of
such a problem in the region. After the Spanish conquest, when the indigenous population collapsed
from disease, the communities abandoned their terraced lands, which then eroded. The remaining
populations moved to the valleys and adopted laborsaving practices from the Spanish, such as
cultivating wheat and using plows. As the population recovered during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, collective institutions evolved that reestablished terraces. Erosion was reduced, soil
dynamics were stabilized, and perhaps some soil accumulation was stimulated. But this type of
landscape transformation needed continuous and proper maintenance. If a terrace were allowed to
erode the soil would wash down and damage lower terraces; there was the potential for severe slope
instability. What made the necessary maintenance possible were collective institutions, which first
revolved around the Church and then, after independence from Spain, around rich Indians called
caciques. These institutions mobilized peasant labor for key activities—not only maintaining terraces,
but also sowing corn in work teams and maintaining a diversity of maize varieties and cultivation
techniques. The caciques benefited from what was produced, but were expected to look after the
peasants in hard times, a so-called moral economy (Scott 1976). Given that the peasants felt security
in proportion to the wealth and prestige of their cacique, and given that prestige attached directly to
each person’s role in the collective labor, the labor tended to be very efficient. In addition, peasants
were kept indebted to caciques, and could not readily break their unequal relationship. The caciques
insulated this relationship from change by resisting potential laborsaving technologies and ties to
outside markets in maize.
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The Mexican revolution ruptured the closed system of reciprocal obligations and benefits by taking
away the power of the caciques and opening the communities to the changing outside world. Many
peasants migrated to industrial areas, sending cash back or bringing it with them when they returned to
the community for periods of time. Rural population declined; transactions became monetarized; and
prestige no longer derived from one’s place in the collective labor. With the monetarization and loss of
labor, the collective institutions collapsed and terraces began to erode. National food-pricing policies
favored urban consumers, which meant that corn was grown only for subsistence needs in this area.
Little incentive remained for intensive agricultural production. New laborsaving activities, such as goat
herding, which contributes in its own way to erosion, were taken up without new local institutions to
regulate them.
This is a diagram I drew to help me narrate this story to others and to highlight a number of themes
pertaining to intersecting processes, which will be reviewed below.

Intersecting processes leading to soil erosion in San Andrés, Oaxaca. The dashed lines indicate
connections across the different strands of the schema. The zig-zag lines indicate institutions that rely
on relationships of inequality. See text for discussion.
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1. Intersecting processes involve inseparable dynamics. Processes of different kinds and scales,
involving heterogeneous elements, are interlinked in the production of any outcome and in their own
on-going transformation. Each is implicated in the others (even by exclusion, such as when caciques
kept maize production during the nineteenth century insulated from external markets). Notice especially
the relationship between environmental degradation and the population decline shown in the top
strand. This association can be used to grab the attention of environmentalists who identify population
growth as a major environmental issue. However, it is neither population decline nor growth, but labor
that was important in this case. Labor is something defined by the technologies of production (the
second strand) and the social institutions that govern it. Such institutions operate both locally (the third
strand) and at places distant from where the erosion occurs (the fourth strand). In short, the
relationship between population and environmental change was highly mediated, depending on the
technologies used and the local and national social and economic institutions through which labor and
production were organized. No one kind of thing, no single strand on its own, is sufficient to explain the
currently eroded hillsides. (This theme can be extended to call into question other explanations for
environmental degradation that center on a single dynamic or process, e.g., climate change in erosive
landscapes; increasing capitalist exploitation of natural resources; or modernization of production
methods.)
The theme of inseparable dynamics can be teased out into four aspects:
2. In intersecting social-environmental processes, differentiation among unequal agents is
implicated. Sustainable maize production depended on a moral economy of cacique and peasants,
and the inequality among these agents resulted from a long process of social and economic
differentiation. Similarly, the demise of this agro-ecology involved the unequal power of the State over
local caciques, of urban industrialists over rural interests, and of workers who remitted cash to their
communities over those who continued agricultural labor.
3. Heterogeneous elements and scales are involved. The situation has involved processes
operating at different spatial and temporal scales, involving elements as diverse as the local climate
and geo-morphology, social norms, work relations, and national political economic policy;
4. Historical contingency is significant. The role of the Mexican revolution in the collapse of
nineteenth-century agro-ecology reveals the contingency that is characteristic of history. The
significance of such contingency rests not on the event of the revolution itself, but on the different
processes, each having a history, with which the revolution intersected; and
5. Structuredness is not reducible to micro- or macro-determinations. Although there is no
reduction to macro- or structural determination in the account of soil erosion, the focus is neither on
local, individual-individual transactions nor on the complex patterns produced by multiple simple
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transactions. Regularities, e.g., the terraces and the moral economy, persist long enough for agents to
recognize or abide by them. That is, structuredness is discernable in the intersecting processes.
The synopsis of a case of soil erosion in Oaxaca has, in addition to the themes above, a number of
implications for thinking about the agency of the people studied and, reflexively, of researchers
reconstructing intersecting processes:
6. The account represents agency as distributed across different kinds of agents and scale, not
something centered in one class or place (Thompson 2002). In the nineteenth-century moral economy
caciques exploited peasants, but in a relationship of reciprocal norms and obligations. Moreover, the
local moral economy was not autonomous—the national political economy was implicated, by its
exclusion, in the actions of the caciques that maintained labor-intensive and self-sufficient production.
Although the Mexican revolution initiated the breakdown in the moral economy, the ensuing process
involved not just political and economic change from above, but also from below and between—semiproletarian peasants brought their money back to the rural community and reshaped its transactions,
institutions, and social psychology.
7. The account has an intermediate complexity—neither highly reduced, nor overwhelmingly detailed.
The elements included in my synopsis and in the diagram are heterogeneous, but I tease out different
strands. The strands, however, are cross-linked; they are not torn apart. By acknowledging this
intermediate level of complexity, the account steps away from debates centered on simple oppositions,
e.g., ecology-geomorphology vs. economy-society, or ecological rationality vs. economic rationality.
Similarly, by placing explanatory focus on the ongoing, intersecting processes, the account discounts
the grand discontinuities and transitions that are often invoked, e.g., peasant to capitalist agriculture, or
feudalism to industrialism to Fordism to flexible specialization.
8. Intermediate complexity accounts favor the idea of multiple, smaller engagements linked together
within the intersecting processes. My synopsis and diagram of the García-Barrioses’ more detailed
account can be read as an engagement with current scholarly discourses in an effort to promote the
concept of distributed agency. This concept has implications not only for how environmental
degradation is conceptualized, but also for how one responds to it in practice. Intersecting processes
accounts do not support government or social movement policies based on simple themes, such as
economic modernization by market liberalization, sustainable development through promotion of
traditional agricultural practices, or mass mobilization to overthrow capitalism.
9. This shift in how policy is conceived suggests a corresponding shift in scholarly practice. On the
level of research organization, intersecting processes accounts highlight the need for trans-disciplinary
work grounded in particular locations. They do not underwrite the customary multi-disciplinary projects
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directed by natural scientists, nor the economic analyses based on the kinds of statistical data
available in published censuses.
10. Finally, the intermediate complexity of the Figure preserves a role for some kind of social scientific
generalization. The synopsis and diagram abstract away an enormous amount of detail, a move that
suggests that the particular case described by the García-Barrioses might be relevant to other cases.
The account does not provide a general explanatory schema, but at least could serve as a template to
guide further studies. Such a template would be elaborated in new research projects once researchers
began to address the particularities of the situation they are studying. In other words, the particularities
of each case would not warrant starting from scratch when attempting to understand and engage in
socio-environmental change. The intermediate complexity of my account also means—and here I am
applying some reflexivity to my own representational work—that I have deflected attention away from
the need to examine the particular institutional and personal resources, agendas, and alliances that
people like me would have to cultivate to gain support for the desired trans-disciplinary research or
policy interventions.
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